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Summary 
The relationship between democracy and nuclear weapons is extremely ambivalent. On 
the one hand, in the theory of democratic peace, democracies are regarded as afraid of risk 
and cost-conscious: their citizens strive to avoid the threat which brings with it the war for 
life, limb and property. Their orientation around welfare, moreover, causes them to limit 
the burden of armament costs and defence expenditure to what is necessary to safeguard 
the existence of the nation-state. We would expect from that that democracies implement 
arms control as a preferred instrument of their security policy. On the other hand, nuclear 
weapons – in the form of deterrence – promise to end war once and for all. This makes 
them attractive to war-shy democracies as an instrument for preventing war. The situa-
tion becomes more complicated when you consider the value patterns of democratic so-
cieties. In these patterns, human life and human dignity are given high priority; nuclear 
weapons are weapons of mass destruction and genocide and should therefore meet with 
disapproval among citizens. We would expect the result of these inconsistent impulses to 
be such that democracies would be in favour of nuclear deterrence, but, instead they suf-
fer from the dilemma of the noble objective of avoiding war, on the one hand, and the 
genocidal character of the weapons, on the other. It would appear, therefore, that democ-
racies are concerned about keeping the number and degree of readiness of these weapons 
to a minimum and being open to opportunities to disarm altogether, should alternative 
paths of guaranteeing national security present themselves. 
The end of the Cold War supplied an interesting opportunity to test these assump-
tions. Nuclear weapons appeared to be indispensable, as long as a powerful, undemo-
cratic, scrupulous and opportunistic-expansive super power without any inclination to be 
open and transparent, the Soviet Union, had to be kept in check. The fall of the Soviet 
Union, therefore, opened up new, incalculable chances for the leading democracy, the 
United States, to reconsider its relationship with nuclear weapons.  
Recognition of these new opportunities was only slow to grow in the first Bush gov-
ernment. Nuclear planning was executed as before, oriented towards a super power, 
whose military – especially nuclear –equipment was to be deemed vulnerable in the face of 
American nuclear weapons. This strategy was continued even when the first breakthrough 
in arms control, the INF Treaty, came to fruition; nor was it abandoned when both sides 
negotiated and concluded the START treaties and clearly reduced tactical nuclear weap-
ons on the basis of unilateral, yet parallel political declarations. The government revived 
nuclear non-proliferation which until the Gulf War had remained neglected in the wings. 
At the end of its term in office, the government declared a nuclear test moratorium, after 
which she put up a strong fight against the proposed conclusion of a Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty. Early plans for the broad modernisation of the nuclear weapons arsenal were 
also abandoned as was the deployment of a new short-range weapon in Europe. The 
structure of the American nuclear forces remained, however, intact like the strategy. The 
first Bush government considered employing nuclear weapons as deterrence, pre-
emption, warfare and retaliation against states possessing weapons of mass destruction. 
This debate began to find its way into strategic planning. 
 II 
The Clinton government’s hopeful, multilateral start gave way to growing signs of uni-
lateralism. However, this government never completely gave up arms control and multi-
lateralism. It reinforced the efforts of the ”Cooperative Threat Reduction Program” that 
aimed to help Russia and other successor states to deal safely with their dangerous inheri-
tance of Soviet weapons of mass destruction. The Clinton government led an energetic 
campaign to obtain the unlimited extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and success-
fully concluded negotiations on the Test Ban Treaty. Yet, the Senate refused to consent to 
ratify this treaty, which was attributed not least to the half-hearted advertising attempts of 
the administration. Under Clinton, the USA worked hard at increasing the transparency 
in the nuclear sector, and achieved temporary agreement with Russia to reduce the strate-
gic arsenals still further. At the same time, the nuclear bureaucracy extended the tradi-
tional philosophy, strategy and weapons structure of the nuclear sector in the ”Nuclear 
Posture Review”. ”Counterproliferation”, i.e., military options versus weapons of mass 
destruction and missiles of ”rogue states”, was officially part of the Pentagon’s strategy; 
nuclear planners also contemplated the option of first strike against these ”new enemies”. 
The violent removal of the Iraqi regime was discussed inside and outside the administra-
tion. 
From this, it emerges that the second President Bush is not inventing the wheel as he 
steps along his unilateral path of security policy. In fact, he is concluding a development 
more than a decade old. September 11th likewise changed nothing in Bush’s nuclear strat-
egy. The ”hawks” in the government pursued their old objectives only with greater deter-
mination; this is where the difference between ”before” and ”after” lies. The security strat-
egy of the Bush government is based on absolute military superiority. As the new Nuclear 
Posture Review reveals, this refers firstly to a smaller arsenal of active and operational 
nuclear weapons, and secondly to a reserve of several thousand warheads, enabling rapid 
development into a ”Cold War” arsenal. In so doing, the administration is aiming to 
maintain complete freedom of action. 
For this reason, the Bush government is against legally binding disarmament treaties. 
Its concession, to conclude the SORT Treaty, reflects this position in a subtle way. The 
treaty is aimed at a reduction in the active, operational, strategic arsenals of 2,500 war-
heads by 2012. The reserves are not affected by the reductions, the nature of the imple-
mentation is open, short-term termination of the treaty is permitted; the treaty ends on 
the date in which it is fulfilled, after which the parties are free to rebuild their arsenals. 
Bush also announced the ABM Treaty and set about building the first elements of a 
missile defence system. The administration claims to have the right to make pre-emptive 
and preventative military strikes against states with weapons of mass destruction and is 
preparing her troops for such missions. This could involve the use of nuclear weapons, 
should their employment be considered necessary to destroy the enemy’s underground 
command facilities or weapons of mass destruction. The administration is examining 
whether new nuclear weapons, the effects of which would be optimised for the job, are 
needed for this purpose. The research and development structure for such planning is 
being manufactured in laboratories. Bush’s security policy has almost no place for multi-
lateral arms control and non-proliferation. 
 III 
A look back at the last fourteen years shows a number of telling patterns. There was a 
steady reduction in the number of deployed nuclear weapons. The structure of the armed 
forces in the nuclear sector has, on the other hand, remained the same. It’s true that the 
list of objectives in Russia no longer determines the permanently applicable objective 
planning; this is now flexible and adaptable to the security situation at the time. The op-
erational arsenal would nevertheless cover the objectives of an attack directed against Rus-
sia’s strategic forces. The supposed democratic preference for minimal deterrent arsenals 
determined the direction but not the substance of the study. The arsenal, available for the 
next decade, is clearly bigger, by far more operational and expandable, than numerous 
non-government experts had recommended and Russian partners had suggested. Clearly, 
the political and bureaucratic preferences which have determined American nuclear pol-
icy in the last fourteen years do not match the model of nuclear policy which we have 
derived from the axioms of ”democratic peace”. This also applies to the negative trend of 
arms control, which started promisingly but which stagnated in the mid-1990’s despite 
the best framework conditions. Today, we are facing the new position of a nuclear-armed, 
pre-emptive, unilateralist, democratic philosophy of superiority, in no way the minimal-
ist, multilateral concept of cooperative security which we expected. 
Yet, democracy plays the role of supporting the argument of the policy, admittedly in a 
quite unexpected way. The characteristic traits of the rival or enemy, be it the Soviet Un-
ion, a Russia which in future returns to totalitarianism, the new competitor China or the 
”rogue states” – were each described, in the context of nuclear strategy, as the opposite of 
democracy. It’s the evil on the other side which justifies the use of reprehensible instru-
ments, so as to thwart it. While the supposed enemy has changed on a few occasions and 
the emphasis on who the main enemy is has also varied, the basic pattern remains – an 
enemy exists and is totalitarian and therefore dangerous and not trustworthy – a constant 
in the structure of American nuclear weapons policy. 
The public debate played a limited and, during the period of study, a diminishing role. 
If it threatened to make its presence felt, it was closed off, as in the Nuclear Posture Re-
view in 1994 or during the Senate resolution on the Test Ban Treaty in 1999. The impres-
sive work of American arms control and disarmament experts on the decline in the im-
portance of nuclear weapons, their reduction or even complete abolition remained con-
fined to the circle of experts and failed to reach the general public. The latter lost interest 
after the end of the East-West conflict removed the danger of a potential nuclear Arma-
geddon. The protectors of the nuclear complex successfully preserved their prerogative 
and even gradually expanded the missions of nuclear weapons (contrary to public impres-
sion). Today, nuclear weapons represent an option in the pre-emption strategy and 
preparations to develop new nuclear weapon types are under way. In the absence of a 
lively public debate, the deterrent side is gaining acceptance in the relationship between 
democracy and nuclear weapons. The arms control side was only successful at the start, 
then it stagnated, only to disappear altogether. In addition, the nuclear establishment 
perceives no contradiction between democratic values and the murderous character of the 
deterrent apparatus. 
 IV 
The consequence is thus clear: in order for the nuclear-critical side to make its pres-
ence felt, democracy must also function in the nuclear sector. It requires an interested and 
attentive public to limit the momentum of the nuclear sector and critically questions the 
development of security paradigms. Such a critical public has not existed in American 
development for the last ten years. It could revive the debate on the Iraq War. 
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1. Democracy, Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament: Expectations 
What do we expect from democracies in the way in which they deal with nuclear weapons 
and their efforts to bring them under control, reduce their numbers, limit their role in 
security policy and ultimately scrap them altogether? The question is not easy to answer.1 
Democracies are predominantly welfare-oriented and are averse to risky arms encounters. 
A wide variety of demands from society and groups representing their interests compete 
for scarce public resources. This sets limits on arms investment, and contrary to popular 
opinion, nuclear weapons are not cheap, in fact, together with all the ancillary and conse-
quential costs, they are extremely expensive.2 Nuclear weapons also seriously increase the 
risk of entering into armed conflict. Insomuch as disarmament offers a chance to reduce 
this risk to a notable extent, it should have a place on democracies’ agenda of security 
interests.  
On the other hand, the nuclear deterrent theory promises the end of all wars; such a 
hope has also combined with other supposed revolutions in military history, but was 
never so emphatically well-founded as what could be possible in terms of weapons when 
nuclear fission and fusion were discovered.
3
 The supposed guarantee of peace entrenched 
in nuclear weapons contradicts the desire of democracies to reduce risk and avoid war. 
The British and, even more so, the French philosophy of deterrence perhaps reflects this 
basic desire which has been translated into a policy of deterrence among the nuclear 
weapon states this the clearest.
4
 
The picture becomes even more complicated when the human factor which forms the 
basis of the democratic community is added. Human dignity and human life are valued 
extremely highly. They play a major part in shaping the structure of democratic constitu-
tions and have increasingly characterised the attitude of democratic societies to war. If at 
the beginning of the last century the sacrifice of soldiers was seen as an inevitable part of 
achieving military victory even by democracies, the expectation of fatalities among one’s 
own troops represents an important criterion today when weighing up the for’s and 
against’s; in fact, the killing of civilians on the enemy side, even the enemy soldiers, is 
increasingly being considered an evil to be avoided if at all possible.
5
 
 
 
1  The following considerations are based on the same considerations connected with Immanuel Kant 
which lie at the basis of the theory of the peacefulness of democracies. Cf. Michael W. Doyle, Ways of 
War and Peace. Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism, New York/London (W.W. Norton), 1997. 
2  Stephen I. Schwartz (ed.), Atomic Audit. The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons since 
1940, Washington, D.C. (Brookings) 1998. 
3 Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, New York 1946; Scott Sa-
gan/Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. A Debate, New York, Norton 1995; Michael 
Quinlan, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons, London (RUSI) 1997. 
4 Simone Wisotzki, Die Nuklearwaffenpolitik Großbritanniens und Frankreichs. Eine konstruktivistische 
Analyse, Frankfurt/M. (Campus ) 2002. 
5  Eric V. Larson, Casualties and Consensus, Santa Monica (RAND) 1996. 
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This leads to an obvious dilemma: the employment of nuclear weapons has the poten-
tial of committing mass murder. By nature, they are indiscriminate and injure civilians as 
well as troops. It is part of the essence of existential deterrence, to bring about peace to a 
certain extent with the threat of the targeted mass destruction of civilians on the other 
side – all refinement of nuclear strategies in increasingly differentiated flexible options has 
done nothing to change this brutal fact.
6
 For this very reason, in its 1996 groundbreaking 
report, the International Court of Justice declared the use of nuclear weapons in almost all 
circumstances to be contrary to international law and only in the case of an existential 
threat to nation and people, was the loophole of a non-decision allowed.
7
 Mass murder 
and the democratic system of values are just as irreconcilable as the destruction of one’s 
own people through nuclear retaliation by the enemy and the democratic unwillingness to 
take risks. A link is thus arduously forged through the believed promise that deterrence 
prevents war in all circumstances. The paradox lies in the fact that the best protection of 
human life and human dignity through lasting peace is owed to an instrument of mass 
murder and the hope of possessing one but not having to use it. 
Democracy and nuclear weapons find themselves in this respect in an irrevocable state 
of tension. We can therefore expect democracies to want to keep their own nuclear arsenal 
to the lowest possible level and develop a strictly defensive doctrine, so that deterrence 
guarantees that the detrimental and therefore harmful impact on international coexis-
tence is minimised. Democracies should also be prepared to exploit the chances offered by 
checking the proliferation nuclear weapons through arms control without hesitation. 
They should also be prepared to follow the path to complete elimination of these weap-
ons, especially if promising alternatives arise for safeguarding their security. If complete 
nuclear disarmament is out of the question, we should at least expect them to create the 
conditions under which the disarmament process can move forward.
8
 
During the East-West conflict, it was admittedly difficult to realise this ideal of democ-
ratic nuclear policy in political practice. In the face of an enemy, whose structural intrans-
parency and occasional opportunistic attempts at expansion encouraged worst-case think-
ing rather than the abandonment of deterrence, a decisive and courageous disarmament 
policy could hardly be pursued. However, the fact that at least tentative steps were taken 
towards nuclear arms control – mainly on the initiative of the United States and her allies 
 
 
6  Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 2. ed., Basingstoke (Macmillan) 1989. 
7  International Court of Justice, Year 1996, General List No. 958, Juli 1996, Legality of the Threat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons. 
8  Harald Müller, Nuclear Disarmament: The Case for Incrementalism, in: John Baylis/Robert O’Neill 
(eds.), Alternative Nuclear Futures. The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World, Ox-
ford/New York (Oxford University Press) 2000, pp. 125-143; with Katja Frank/Alexander Kelle/Sylvia 
Meier/Annette Schaper, Nukleare Abrüstung - Mit welcher Perspektive? Der internationale Diskurs ü-
ber die nukleare Rüstungskontrolle und die Vision einer kernwaffenfreien Welt. Frankfurt (HSFK-
Report No. 8) 1996. 
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9
– could be interpreted as an indication of the immense pressure on democracies to con-
template deterrence only with its enclosure and the prospect of disarmament.  
Whether such an interpretation is plausible can only be clarified by looking at political 
practice at and after the end of the East-West conflict, since this development gave rise to 
hitherto unavailable opportunities, to realise the ”disarmament side” of the democratic 
relationship with nuclear weapons. The different aspects of the change afforded chances of 
a crucial change in nuclear policy that had not existed before: the end of the enmity, the 
discovery of common interests and the material inability of the Soviet Union’s successor 
state, the Russian Federation, to represent any kind of serious military threat. In addition 
to that, Moscow was also prepared to negotiate on arms control and disarmament in its 
entirety and open up the country to an unprecedented level of transparency and verifica-
tion.  
The United States found herself in an historically new situation. She had ended the 
East-West conflict in an undisputed and assured position of superiority. This was owing 
first and foremost, of course, to her military potential, which was not even closely rivalled 
by any other power. But her other resources of power - secret service capabilities, diplo-
matic resources, economic potential, political stability, science and technology, education, 
media and cultural influence, even raw materials and agricultural self-sufficiency – also 
placed the United States at the top, or in any case, among the top of the international 
field. Free from serious, direct security threats, Washington was open to an undreamt-of 
freedom of structure. It could have taken shape in a wide variety of forms; blueprints for 
totally opposing political paths were submitted and over the years developed, from the 
resolute unilateralism of absolute superiority10 to the consistent multilateralism of coop-
erative security policy.11 The international power relations revealed only the possibilities, 
but did not dictate the choice of a particular strategy. It would therefore be a real mistake 
to judge nuclear policy of the 1990’s as the consequence of American superiority. It is 
more like the result of a series of decisions made from equally possible choices. We are 
therefore referring to the internal American strategy debates and their supporters. The 
structure of the international system provides us with only information on the range of 
options, not their selection. 
Our question is, therefore, whether these decisions confirm the above-developed as-
sumption of the way democracies prefer to deal with nuclear weapons. If so, we should be 
able to determine dramatic changes in the 1990’s, in the scope, – i.e., carrier systems and 
 
 
9  Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control: A guide to Negotiations and Agreements, London (Sage) 1994; Stuart 
Croft, Strategies of arms control : a history and typology. – Manchester (et al.) (Manchester Univ. 
Press), 1996. 
10  Samuel P. Huntington, Why International Primacy Matters, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4, 
Spring 1993, pp. 71-81; Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1, 
1990/1991. 
11  Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead. The Changing Nature of American Power, New York 1990; ibid, The 
Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone. New York/Oxford 
2002; Janne E. Nolan (ed..), Global Engagement. Cooperation and Security in the 21. Century, Wash-
ington, D.C. (Brookings) 1994. 
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warheads – and in the structure, – i.e., the composition of the arsenal from the triad of 
bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine missiles on the one hand, and 
the tactical nuclear weapons on the other. We would expect a transition in the determina-
tion of purpose of the American nuclear forces, i.e., in their role as a deterrence and leaders 
of conventional, unconventional and nuclear wars. The United States should then have 
defined arms control as a priority instrument in cooperative security, taken the opportu-
nities to reduce her nuclear potential as much as possible and gradually changed the func-
tion of the nuclear weapons in the direction of defensive ”existential deterrence” for her 
own security. On the other hand, if the nuclear policy of the East-West conflict is found to 
have been more or less continued, the expectation derived from democracy theory will be 
disappointing. The same applies, of course, to change, which has accentuated rather than 
weakened the function of nuclear weapons. 
The following study is limited to an analysis of the considerations and debates of the 
executive, who are the basic supporters of the nuclear policy. We will look at the admini-
stration of the first President Bush, the two Clinton administrations and the present 
American government, the stages in nuclear strategy, the structure of the American nu-
clear arsenal and nuclear arms control, each against the backdrop of her more general 
global ideas. The decisive criterion that we raise is the relationship between continuity and 
change. 
2. The Nuclear Policy of the first Bush Administration 
2.1 Foreign policy and security policy guidelines 
The government of George Bush Senior took office in Anno Mirabile 1989: Gorbachov 
had by this time permitted binding, on-site manoeuvre observations for the first time 
(1986), accepted vastly unequal arms reductions in the INF Treaty to the disadvantage of 
the Soviet Union as well as an extensive system of inspections (1987). Troops had begun 
to withdraw from Afghanistan, concessions in the area of conventional arms control had 
been offered. In the Soviet Union the general public held an unprecedented range of opin-
ion, still a long way from the freedom of opinion enjoyed by Western democracies, but 
the trend was clear. 
Bearing in mind this starting point, the Bush administration appeared unexplainably 
motionless in its first year.12 We cannot talk of an unwillingness to take risks here, since 
adjusting to the clear changes in Soviet policy would scarcely have constituted a risk. In 
fact, these changes were measured against the perception framework of the Cold War; 
these deficits in perception were spread unequally with the administration.13 The least 
 
 
12  Cf. the following: Michael R. Beschloss/Strobe Talbott, Auf höchster Ebene. Das Ende des Kalten Krie-
ges und die Geheimdiplomatie der Supermächte 1989-1991, Düsseldorf et al. (Econ) 1993, Chap. 2. 
13 Jürgen Wilzewski, Triumph der Legislative. Zum Wandel der amerikanischen Sicherheitspolitik 1981-
1991, Frankfurt/New York (Campus) 1999, pp. 192-199. 
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rigid and the person first prepared to admit to the global vs. political will to change was 
the pragmatic Foreign Minister Baker, not least because of his excellent relations with his 
Soviet counterpart, Mr Shevardnadze. Very early on, he defined his task as being to assist 
in providing a ”soft landing” for the declining Soviet Union super power, as risk-free as 
possible – a cooperative project, in principle.14 President Bush was more hesitant, yet he 
continued to make decisions which did not obstruct the progress of things.15 Security Ad-
visor Scowcroft, who in 1989 saw through the cunning Soviet policy which aimed to split 
the Western Alliance, acted conservatively and overcautiously.16 His deputy, Gates, a sur-
vivor of the Reagan administration in which he has acted as the deputy CIA director, was 
completely unmoved. In October 1989 (!), Gates tried to put the brakes on the positive 
development of American-Soviet relations by way of an extremely pessimistic talk on the 
future of Gorbachov; Baker managed with some difficulty to prevent the talk from taking 
place.17 The protagonists of the Pentagon, Defence Minister Cheney and his Chief-of-Staff 
Crowe (the situation improved after Colin Powell took up the position) also did not want 
to have anything to do with a basic policy change. Up until 1990, Cheney, like Scowcroft 
one year before, considered Gorbachov’s reforms to be an attempt at deception. After-
wards he argued that Gorbachov would not hold on to power for long and that his succes-
sors would return to the old policy.18 The relevant documents from the Pentagon held 
onto the conventional situation analysis just as persistently.19 Vice-President Quayle sur-
passed everyone, when in 1991 he not quite so correctly remarked that the Cold War was 
at an end.20 
So, the start of the administration was defined by a motionless which in hindsight in 
view of the historic year seems unbelievable. It found its expression in the ”Strategic Re-
view”, a blueprint for global strategy, the profound immobility of which made even the 
highly cautious Baker impatient.21 
Bush and Baker were ultimately capable of adjusting quickly to the new opportunities 
and forging an increasingly close cooperation with the Soviet Union and its nuclear suc-
cessor state Russia on the political level. The political guideline was to complete the revo-
lutionary change in Eastern Europe without armed conflict and to support the transition 
of the Soviet Union, later Russia, to a democratic, market economy, which in practice was 
halfway successful, even when the image of the enemy still existed in conservative circles 
throughout the nineties. In this respect, the senior politicians in Washington had to pro-
 
 
14  James A. Baker, III, The Politics of Diplomacy. Revolution, War and Peace 1989-1992, New York 1995, 
pp. 41ff. 
15 George Bush/Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, New York 1998, pp. 8f; 55. 
16  Cf. Bush/Scowcroft, loc.cit. (Note 15), pp. 12f; 114, 135. 
17  Cf. Baker, loc.cit. (Note 14), pp. 156f. 
18  Cf. Baker, loc.cit. (Note 14), p. 70. Cf. Bush/Scowcroft, loc.cit. (Note 15), pp. 154f, 208. 
19  Z.B. Secretary of Defense, Soviet Military Power, Washington D.C. 1989, 1990. 
20  Cf. Bush/Scowcroft, loc.cit. (Note 15), p. 155. 
21  Cf. Baker, loc.cit. (Note 14), pp. 68f. 
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tect their flank at all times against criticism form the right.22 It is worth mentioning that 
the Bush administration also managed to limit the effects of the Tiananmen Square mas-
sacre to strategic relations with the other potentially hostile super power, China, using a 
clever mix of public criticism and continued willingness to talk, despite heavy reproaches 
from Congress.23 Since even Bush’s vision articulated after the Gulf War of the ”new world 
order” aimed at stabilising the cooperative relations between super powers, the internal 
systems of which continued to remain heterogeneous, and the interests of which in a sta-
ble world nevertheless overlapped. It is precisely this indifference to the moral differences 
between democracies and non-democracies which made the ”new world order” project a 
bone of contention not just for the democratic election opponents, but also for the con-
servatives in Bush’s own Republican camp, which included vehement critics of China, but 
also in which the number of ”Wilsonians in military boots” was increasing, who were 
prepared to push forward the democratic ideal, with violent means if necessary.24 
2.2 Nuclear strategy and nuclear weapon projects at the end of the East-West conflict 
Nuclear strategy was a different picture. Here, the change took longer to complete, and at 
the end of the Bush government a breakthrough had not been achieved. Initially, the 
president intended to continue to put pressure on Gorbachov by continuing US nuclear 
armament as well as the missile defence plans – a real backwards step compared to the 
Gorbachov enthusiast, President Reagan. Even Scowcroft thought at first that the drastic 
reductions in strategic nuclear forces ought to stop.
25
 
Within the framework of NATO, the Bush government, loudly supported by Margaret 
Thatcher,
26
 pursued a ”second deployment of new arms”, the replacement of Lance short-
range missiles with a more powerful system and the equipping of fighter planes designed 
for nuclear attack with nuclear-armed long-range weapons. Scarcely two years after the 
signing of the INF Treaty, of the first nuclear disarmament treaty with an asymmetrical 
disarmament obligation to the disadvantage of Moscow, these plans must have appeared 
like a colossal affront and as a failing of Gorbachov’s policy of rapprochement. Today, we 
can only speculate what course 1989 would have taken had NATO pursued the British-
American intentions at its spring summit and resolved to deploy the Lance successor sys-
tems. The fact that it did not come to that was thanks primarily to the German govern-
 
 
22 Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Weltpolitik im Umbruch. Das Internationale System nach Ende des Ost-West-
Konflikts, München (Beck) 1993, p. 39. 
23 Cf. Baker, loc.cit. (Note 14), p. 114. Cf. Bush/Scowcroft, loc.cit. (Note 15), p. 111. Christian Hacke, Zur 
Weltmacht verdammt. Die amerikanische Außenpolitik von Kennedy bis Clinton, Berlin (Ullstein) 
1997, pp. 387ff.  
24 William G. Hyland, Clinton's World. Remaking American Foreign Policy, Westport/London (Preager) 
1999, pp.8f; Pierre Hassner, The United States: the empire of force or the force of empire, Paris (ISS) 
Chaillot Paper No. 54, 2002. 
25 Martin Kahl, Abschreckung und Kriegführung. Amerikanische Nuklearstrategie, Waffenentwicklung 
und nukleare Rüstungskontrolle von Kennedy bis Bush, Bochum (Brockmeyer) 1994, pp. 700f. 
26 Margaret Thatcher, Downing Street No. 10, Düsseldorf et al. 1993, pp. 1085ff.  
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ment. Germany made it perfectly clear to the allies and to the public that she would not be 
involved in a decision to deploy new arms in 1989 and, on top of that, she wanted to take 
up arms control talks regarding these systems, which was not welcomed in Washington or 
London. Bonn’s position (supported by a number of other European NATO members) 
forced a rethink in Washington. Bush combined the question of NATO short-range 
weapons with progress in conventional arms control, i.e., dismantling Soviet superiority. 
An essential part of the U-turn made by the American government was the consideration 
shown to the interests of the German ally not to be burdened with a new arms modernisa-
tion debate in the election campaign. It was not so much the differing view of the situa-
tion by the German government and the resulting preference for a more cooperative 
strategy with Moscow which forced Washington to about-turn, but its respect for the 
pacifist conviction of the German voters.
27
 
Under these auspices, Bush agreed to postpone the modernisation decision and de-
clared himself willing to take part in arms control talks as soon as the planned reduction 
in conventional forces was under way. The allies agreed with this position (admittedly at 
the displeasure of the British prime minister)
28
 enabling Gorbachov to reply with his own 
disarmament initiatives. 29 
It was now clear that American security policy was most definitely connected to nu-
clear strategy.
30
 For NATO, the key role of this ”Flexible Response” involved the nuclear 
systems deployed in Europe.
31
 Flexibility had declined since 1991 alongside the drastic 
reduction of American nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and the cut-back in nuclear 
weapon types to a core – nuclear aerial bombs – in view of the growing superiority and 
precision of the American air force.
32
 For the strategic forces, this was the triad of bomb-
ers, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and sea-based missiles and cruise mis-
siles designated to cover all war-relevant, military, industrial and political targets.
33
 There-
fore, on the advice of the Pentagon, Bush stuck at first to the arming plans which planned 
for the deployment of movable MX missiles and more B-2 stealth bombers and a new, 
mobile intercontinental missile with one warhead and the expansion of the Trident sub-
marine fleet.
34
 Although Congress did not fundamentally change the direction of nuclear 
policy at this stage, it did reduce the scale of the deployment through attempts at curtail-
ing the budget.
35
 
 
 
27  Cf. Baker, Chap. 4, loc.cit. (Note 14). Cf. Bush/Scowcroft, Chap. 3, loc.cit. (Note 15). 
28  Cf. Bush/Scowcroft, loc.cit. (Note 15), p. 82. 
29  After the postponement period had expired and the CSE Treaty had been signed for some time, a con-
ventional balance was created in Europe, so that the ”second deployment of new arms” was finally 
placed ad Acta.  
30  Baker accused this conservatism of generality, cf. Baker, loc.cit. (Note 14), p. 93. 
31  Cf. Bush/Scrowcroft, loc.cit. (Note 15), p. 40. 
32  Cf. Kahl, loc.cit. (Note 25), pp. 776f. 
33 Cf. Wilzewski, loc.cit. (Note 13), pp. 2f. 
34  Cf. Kahl, loc.cit. (Note 25), pp. 714-718. 
35  Cf. Wilzewski, loc.cit. (Note 13), p. 23. 
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The strategic argument behind this policy comprised two connected arguments: firstly, 
as during the Cold War, the contrast between democracy and communism was stressed. 
Gorbachov as a communist was not to be trusted (first phase); the Soviet elite as a whole 
was not to be trusted, even if Gorbachov and his followers proved themselves to be open 
to reform and democracy (second phase); the Soviet Union (Russia) could revert at any 
time into a pre-democratic state and thus become a threat once more. Consequently, ac-
cording to the second stage of the argument, America had to maintain a nuclear arsenal to 
protect her democracy and her democratic allies, which would resemble the structure, if 
not the quantity, of the arsenal which had kept the old Soviet Union in check. After all, 
the mentality and the resulting strategic calculation that it was aimed at deterrence or – in 
an uncertain future – would aim at deterrence, was the same: a totalitarian way of think-
ing with an expansive or opportunistic attempt at expansion and a disregard for human 
dignity and human rights. 
In 1992, the Pentagon implemented a major adjustment which adapted the American 
Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) to the START I reductions and – which allowed 
additional flexibility with fewer numbers of warheads – consolidated the nuclear com-
mands of the part-time forces into one single strategic command. The structure of SIOP 
and its main aim to destroy the Russian launching bases remained constant.
36
 The persis-
tence of the military and civil nuclear bureaucracy adamantly refused to accept any far-
reaching reduction (amazingly in conventional weapons, too, to start with!).
37
 The fact 
that in 1990 it was still believed they needed more than 9,500 warheads against Gor-
bachov’s Soviet Union under the START I rules on numbers (see below), and even after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union needed more than 3,000 warheads under START II, to 
maintain a threat on all remaining military targets, underlines the strategic conservatism 
beautifully.
38
 Furthermore, in the ”Defense Planning Guidance” in 1992, the Pentagon 
strove to cover all targets which the Russian command valued – at present and in the fu-
ture.
39
 Wherever a change in foreign policy was pushed through enthusiastically at the seat 
of power, it could not be implemented fully in the strategic field. By the end of the Bush 
administration, foreign policy and nuclear strategy were running asynchronously.
40
 
In addition to strategic conservatism, a dynamic further development of threat analysis 
and strategic reply also emerged, which had in fact started before 1990, but owing to the 
Gulf War gained a certain momentum in the next decade. In the meantime, a study drawn 
up under the auspices of the then head of the policy department of the Pentagon, Paul 
 
 
36  Cf. Nolan, loc.cit. (Note 11), pp. 250-252. 
37  Cf. Bush/Scowcroft, loc.cit. (Note 15), pp. 74f. 
38 Baker complained at this stage ”Our Department of Defense seemed to be a bigger problem than Mos-
cow’s... The arms control theologians at the Pentagon seemed to prefer no agreement than one that got 
us ‘only’ ninety percent of what we wanted.”. Cf. Baker, loc.cit. (Note 14), p. 670. Cf. Bush/Scowcroft, 
loc.cit. (Note 15), p. 208. 
39 Peter Rudolf, Nicht mehr Gegner, noch nicht Partner. Von der Sowjetunion- zur Russlandpolitik, in: 
Matthias Dembinski/Peter Rudolf/Jürgen Wilzewski (eds..), Amerikanische Weltpolitik nach dem Ost-
West-Konflikt, Baden-Baden (Nomos) 1994, pp 97-137, here p. 113. 
40 Cf. Wilzewski, loc.cit. (Note 13), p. 211. 
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Wolfowitz, contemplated Germany and Japan as potential future rivals: a nuclear guaran-
tee for these two powers was an essential means of protecting American hegemony and 
world peace. Sharp protest from the two countries caused the administration to withdraw 
this provoking document as quickly as possible.
41
 In the increasingly hectic search for new 
enemies, the military planners and their political superiors turned their spotlight to the 
handful of anti-American dictators who harboured (either defensively or offensively mo-
tivated) ambitions for weapons of mass destruction; to start with, this took place as part of 
a threat analysis organised by Chief-of-Staff Powell with the explicit aim of finding a rea-
son to keep the extensive military arsenal beyond the end of the Cold War.
42
 This initiative 
fused with the growing interest from the Pentagon in the previously neglected prolifera-
tion problem that had found expression in the setting up of a workgroup for ”Counter-
proliferation Measures” in 1989.
43
 The need to strive for the deterrence effect even in re-
gional crises was recognised as an important lesson from the Gulf War. An important, 
new function was thus ascribed to the American nuclear arsenal. The fact that this role 
could also have an effect on its composition, was suggested by studies conducted by the 
Pentagon and the weapons laboratories in 1992, in which the development of relatively 
small calibre, nuclear warheads was proposed in order to attack and reliably destroy im-
portant targets in regional conflicts (underground command positions, biological and 
chemical weapon production facilities and stores). These proposals were still being im-
plemented under Cheney in a new Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy.
44
 At the same 
time, a study group made up of Democratic party supporters and later members of the 
Clinton administration at Harvard University conducted a study in which the possibility 
of ”pre-emptive defence” against nuclear-armed ”rogue states” was also looked into.
45
 
2.3 Nuclear arms control policy 
2.3.1 The START Treaties 
The START I Treaty signed shortly before the Moscow coup d’état in July 1991 followed 
the traditional arms control of the Cold War, which did not permit obvious disarmament 
 
 
41 Excerpts from Pentagon Plan: 'Prevent the Emergence of a New Rival, New York Times, 8. 3. 1992, p. 
14; Michael Klare. Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws. America’s Search for a New Foreign Policy, New 
York (Hill and Wang) 1995, pp. 99-103. 
42 Cf. Klare, loc.cit. (Note 41), pp. 10f. 
43  Eric Chauvistré, Das Atomare Dilemma. Die Raketenabwehrpläne der USA, Berlin (Espresso Verl.) 
2001, p. 83. 
44 Cf. Nolan, loc.cit. (Note 11), p. 256; Hans M. Kristgensen/Josuha Handler, Changing Targets: Nuclear 
Doctrine from the Cold War to the Third World, Greenpeace Foundation 1995. Cf. Klare, loc.cit. (Note 
41), pp. 121-125. 
45 Robert D. Blackwill/Albert Carnesale (eds.), The New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for U.S. Policy, 
New York (Council on Foreign Relations Pr.) 1993. 
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(START = Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty).46 Talks had begun during the Cold War in 
June 1982. Like the SALT Treaties negotiated in the 1970s, START I aimed to stabilise 
nuclear deterrence and limit strategic systems (SALT = Strategic Arms Limitation Talks). 
All the same, the treaty not only limited the number of strategic missiles, it also reduced 
the number of warheads.47 
The treaty failed to exploit the opportunities for taking radical disarmament action at 
the end of the East-West conflict by a long chalk. The Soviet Union and the United States 
left their option to modernise their arsenals unhindered open. The original intention was 
to halve them, but due to further rules on numbers agreed between Reagan and Gor-
bachov, the arsenals were only reduced by 20-30%. Qualitative modernisation was not 
limited, i.e., there was no ban on the development, testing or production of improved and 
new systems.  
Although Reagan and Gorbachov had already agreed on the key figures of an agree-
ment in December 1987 at the Washington summit, negotiations still proceeded ever so 
slowly. Even at the end of Reagan’s term in office, there were some fundamental issues 
still to be resolved, e.g. the relationship between START and the Strategic Defense Initia-
tive (SDI) and the limitation of nuclear cruise missiles – but these differences could have 
been speedily cleared up. The Americans permitted slightly more movement at the end of 
December 1989 as a result of public opinion which favoured further disarmament.48 The 
American president aimed to be more of an initiator of than an obstacle to the disarma-
ment process.49 Nevertheless, the talks remained fragile since the Bush administration 
slipped back into an old pattern of arms control policy aimed at unilaterally limiting the 
military capabilities of the enemy, without conceding equivalent limitations on its own 
side. The USA wanted to ban mobile, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles with 
multiple warheads but not include sea-based systems in the ban since the USA possessed a 
clear advantage in this respect. 
In mid-June, Bush and Gorbachov agreed on a framework agreement. However, this 
came up against heavy criticism in conservative circles: in view of the Soviet military ac-
tion in the Baltics, American consent would send the wrong signal to the Soviet Union. 
Therefore, it was delayed one year until it was finally signed in summer 1991. 
 
 
46 Wilzewski, loc.cit. (Note 13), pp. 204-210; Kahl, loc.cit. (Note 25), pp. 714-720; Jürgen Wilzewski, Der 
START-Vertrag, in: Johannes Schwerdtfeger et al. (eds.), Friedensgutachten 1991, Münster (Lit-Verlag) 
1991. 
47  Treaty Text: http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trty/10423.htm. A summary of the treaty is: A START Briefing 
Book, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1991, p. 24. 
48 The peace movement was still active at the end of the 1980’s. In the USA it was represented especially by 
Freeze, under the roof of which a wealth of further organisations had gathered. There particular objec-
tive was far-reaching nuclear disarmament. See e.g. Bruce Ferguson, Different agendas, styles shape 
SANE/Freeze, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1988, p. 26. 
49  Wilzewski, loc.cit. (Note 13), p. 207. 
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During the course of the following year, The USA’s readiness to make concessions in 
nuclear policy increased.50 The USA therefore reacted to the amended political framework 
conditions after the failed coup in August 1991 and the collapse of the USSR. Now, even 
the hardliners of the Bush administration accepted that the re-established of an expan-
sionist, totalitarian system was unlikely. Instead, the administration perceived three new 
dangers: the former Soviet Union could disintegrate in several states possessing nuclear 
weapons, control over the former Soviet nuclear weapons could be lost – resulting in their 
uncontrolled proliferation – and, last but not least, the further disintegration of Russia 
could not be ruled out, with unforeseeable consequences for the behaviour of future hold-
ers of nuclear weapons. The assumption that possessing nuclear weapons automatically 
leads to rational behaviour was shattered. In the later half of 1991, Bush began to react to 
these dangers. 
In September 1991, in an address to the nation, he announced a fundamental re-
evaluation of US nuclear policy, as well as far-reaching disarmament measures, including 
the unilateral disarmament of tactical nuclear weapons (cf. Section 2.4.2.), in addition to 
calling for the abolition of multiple warheads on land-based ICBMs.51 As it was, the pro-
posed latter measure would have distributed the burdens very unequally, since the Soviet 
Union in particular would have had to disarm, but the dialogue for new START talks had 
started. In January 1992,the announcement of further disarmament initiatives followed in 
a report on the state of the nation.52 Both steps were answered positively by the 
USSR/Russia. In July 1992, Bush and Yeltsin agreed on strategic disarmament way beyond 
that provided for in START I. In January 1993, after just six months of talks, the START II 
Treaty was signed. 
START II is the first treaty which reached beyond the arms control of the Cold War 
and clearly reduced nuclear potential.53 It provides for the number of strategic nuclear 
warheads to be reduced from over 10,000 on each side to 3,000 - 3,500 on each side by 
2003, i.e., to cut the potential permitted in START I by around a half. The qualitative lim-
its are also notable: the treaty bans all land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles with 
multiple warheads and– as an American concession – provides for the reduction of 
American sea-based warheads by a half.54 
 
 
50  Matthias Dembinski, Mit START zum Ziel der allgemeinen und vollständigen Abrüstung? Frankfurt 
(HSFK-Report 3) 1993. 
51  George Bush, Address to the Nation on Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons, Septem-
ber 27, 1991, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1991/91092704.html. 
52  Matthias Dembinski/Jürgen Wilzewski, Strategische und taktische Nuklearwaffen, in: Reinhard Mutz et 
al., Friedensgutachten 1992, Münster (Lit-Verlag) 1992, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress 
on the State of the Union, January 28, 1992, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/ papers/1992/92012801.html. 
53 Cf. Dembinski, loc.cit. (Note 50); Matthias Dembinski/Jürgen Wilzewski, Die nukleare Abrüstung der 
Vereinigten Staaten und Russland, in: Gert Krell et al. (eds..), Friedensgutachten 1993, Münster (Lit-
Verlag) 1993. 
54  Treaty text at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/salt2-1.html. 
12 Harald Müller/Annette Schaper 
 
 
Together with unilateral disarmament steps implemented by both sides (cf. Section 
2.4.2), the treaty put an end to the nuclear arms race and, for the first time, promised the 
prospect of radical disarmament. Cooperative denuclearisation now stood at the centre of 
debate instead of the stabilisation of the arms race. However, at the time of signing the 
treaty, the finer points of implementation had yet to be clarified – there was no telling 
how long the treaty would remain just on paper. Despite all these changes, the basis of 
American nuclear strategy and the structure of SIOP still remained untouched. 
2.3.2 Unilateral measures for tactical nuclear weapons 
The START Treaties omitted an important class of American and Russian nuclear weap-
ons – tactical nuclear weapons (TNW).55 But, in his announcement of a re-evaluation of 
American nuclear weapon policy on 17 September 1991, Bush also promised to abolish 
the entire arsenal of land-based TNW worldwide, as well as all nuclear weapons on ships 
and attack submarines, as well as the withdrawal of sea-launched cruise missiles, (SLCMs) 
with nuclear warheads from ships and to store them centrally in the USA. The aim of the 
announcement was to provoke a reciprocal reply, which in fact arrived promptly on 5 
October. Gorbachov announced similar measures with just a few variations. The reduc-
tions were to be implemented by 2000.56 
In the run-up, there had been discussions, information campaigns and protest from 
various non-government organisations and activists against the acquisition of the B-2 
stealth bombers. In the main, they criticised the high acquisition costs and the distribu-
tion of roles between conventional and nuclear missions. Such protest contributed to the 
delegitimisation of tactical nuclear weapons and ultimately resulted in just 15 units being 
purchased.57 
In addition to this, various non-government organisations and think tanks had sub-
mitted reports on extensive disarmament. A 1991 study by the Committee on International 
Security and Arms Control (CISAC) of the National Academy of Sciences was given par-
ticular consideration. In this study, the traditionally influential CISAC proposed the com-
plete elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and the disarmament of up to 
90% of all strategic nuclear weapons.58 
In his declaration, Bush’s reason for opting for a unilateral announcement was the ur-
gency of the matter: disarmament had to proceed quickly and decisively, drawn-out talks 
would only cause it to falter. However, a further reason was also that he wanted to win the 
 
 
55  William C. Potter/Nikolai Sokov/Harald Müller/Annette Schaper, Tactical Nuclear Weapons – Options 
for Control, UNIDIR Research Report, Geneva, 2000. 
56 This set target was presumably observed, but due to the lack of transparency of the disarmament activi-
ties, the details are contradictory. 
57 Union of Concerned Scientists, About Us, http://www.ucsusa.org/ucs/about/page.cfm?pageID=767. See 
also John Isaacs, Sunscreens and Bullions for the B-2, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 46, No. 3, 
April 1990. 
58 Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences, The Future of 
the U.S -Soviet Nuclear Relationship, (National Academies Press) 1991. 
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support of the conservative circles and the military, and this was easier using measures 
which did not result in anything binding and which could be retracted at any time, rather 
than a binding treaty, which, on top of everything, would provide for detailed verification 
measures including on-site inspections. In Moscow, there was still hope that it would lead 
to talks. As it became clear that the USA was not interested in talks, Moscow was disap-
pointed but came to terms with the situation anyway. Yeltsin confirmed that his govern-
ment would abide by Gorbachov’s declaration. 
The lack of a treaty also proved to be a disadvantage. Although both sides regularly in-
form each other of the continued progress of efforts to disarm, there is no verification of 
or official statements on the number of warheads still deployed, and also very little as to 
how many can be found in central stores or have already been scrapped. To date, all re-
ports on the implementation of unilateral commitments have been contradictory, and 
various details on the number of warheads still in existence also contradict each other.59 
Research and development into new nuclear weapon types has moreover been possible 
without restriction. The new regime is also extremely unstable: each proposed change to 
the original declarations could be interpreted as a breach, leading to its collapse. The dis-
armament of tactical nuclear weapons therefore lacks the transparency as well as the irre-
versibility, two of the potential features which would ensure it lasting success. 
It is true that the Bush government wanted quick success which would doubtless have 
removed or mitigated a few dangers; instead it made sure that its own commitments were 
minimised. 
2.3.3 The negative attitude to the Test Ban Treaty 
Despite deep-reaching global changes, the Bush government continued to reject a Com-
prehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).  
Opposition to nuclear experiments in the USA has a long tradition.60 At the start of the 
1990’s, the number of non-government organisations against nuclear tests grew.61 In 1991, 
an opinion survey showed that 87% of Americans wanted a test ban, but did not consider 
it realistic.62 The end of the East-West conflict and the other nuclear disarmament initia-
tives in particular contributed to the delegitimisation of further nuclear tests. In view of 
 
 
59 Details are only available from independent research institutes. Institutes who have collated precise 
listings and figures, also maintain detailed websites. See also especially the pages of the Federation of 
American Scientists (FAS): http://www.fas.org and the Center for Defense Organization (CDI): 
www.cdi.org. See also the appendix by Potter et al., loc.cit. (Note 55). 
60 Trevor Findlay, Public Opinion on Nuclear Testing, in: Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(ed.), Towards a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, May 1992, pp. 37– 46. 
61 Including ”Toward A Comprehensive Nuclear Warhead Test Ban” (Moscow), International Physicians 
for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), National Resources Defense Council (NRDC, Washing-
ton), the Nevada-Semipalatinsk-Movement, Greenpeace, Peace Action and Physicians for Social Re-
sponsibility and the US Comprehensive Test Ban Coalition (comprising 73 organisations). 
62 Cf. Findlay, loc.cit. (Note 60). 
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the public mood, Congress adopted a law in 1990 which awarded compensation to those 
injured by the fallout of overground tests. This, too, further delegitimised nuclear tests. 
International pressure rose, too. Increasingly more governments called for a CTBT. At 
the ”Amendment Conference” to the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in January 1991, all 
95 states present except for the USA and Great Britain supported a CTBT.63 Furthermore, 
the US government tried to stop all diplomatic efforts at starting talks.64 The Bush gov-
ernment even fell behind the policy declared by Ronald Reagan, to be prepared to enter 
into test ban talks, once the verification issues had been cleared up and the Threshold Test 
Ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Limitation of ”Peaceful Nuclear Explosions” had been 
ratified.
65
 Instead, American participation in talks was postponed indefinitely.
66
 
A strong lobby from the nuclear weapons laboratories and the defence establishment 
supported the opposition to the Bush administration against a CTBT. This also provided 
– highly disputed – arguments for the public debate. Discussion no longer concerned the 
East-West conflict, but the verifiability, future security, reliability and modernisability of 
US nuclear weapons.67 
Another of the opponents’ argument to a CTBT was the option of developing new nu-
clear weapon types again in the future. However, this failed to have any power of convic-
tion in a mood already set for nuclear disarmament and produced instead further indig-
nation among supporters. Since July 1990, the USA had in fact not developed any new 
nuclear warheads. Halfway through 1992, President George Bush turned this reality into 
official policy when he announced that all existing development programmes for new 
types of nuclear weapons would be stopped. In this context, the vehement opposition to 
the administration against a CTBT is even more conspicuous: they support a fundamental 
conservatism and a strong influence from the weapon laboratories’ lobby.68 This was be-
cause, during the Cold War, nuclear tests also had the role of proving the USA’s superior-
ity and stressing the need for nuclear weapons as a deterrent, a role which supporters of a 
CTBT considered obsolete. 
Following the end of the East-West conflict, international pressure had grown so much 
that in 1991 Gorbachov first of all called for a test moratorium, which France and the USA 
 
 
63 Cf. Findlay, loc.cit. (Note 60). 
64 Katherine Magraw, The United States, in: Eric Arnett, Nuclear Weapons after the Comprehensive Test 
Ban – Implications for Modernization and Proliferation, Sipri, Oxford (University Press) 1996. 
65  Together the two treaties (signed 1974 and 1976) ban nuclear explosions of more than 150 kt explosive 
force. 
66  PPNN Newsbrief 9, Spring 1990, p. 6. 
67 There is a wealth of literature in this area. A detailed early contribution is: Steve Fetter, Toward a Com-
prehensive Test Ban, Cambridge, 1988. 
68 The extent of such an influence is shown, for example, in the history of talks behind the Moscow Nu-
clear Test Ban Treaty, in which the original aim was to ban all nuclear explosions and not just those in 
the atmosphere (as was actually agreed): a reason for the failure was not least the influence of hydrogen 
bomb inventor Edward Teller, who claimed that further tests should be carried out in order to develop 
a nuclear weapon without radioactive fallout. 
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as a result of pressure from Congress joined in 1992. In contrast to the Bush government, 
Congress – then in the hands of the Democrats – supported a CTBT and, in October 
1992, despite resistance from the Bush administration, passed a law supporting a test 
moratorium. The President was also to develop a plan showing how the conclusion of a 
CTBT could be achieved by 1996. After a slight delay and some major debates within the 
executive, Bush ratified the law.69 
The activities of numerous non-government organisations, activists and initiatives, 
which towards the end of the East-West conflict had become very popular, also contrib-
uted to this development and organised extensive information campaigns on the dangers 
of continued nuclear explosions and the advantages of a test ban.70  
2.3.4 Non-proliferation policy 
The nuclear non-proliferation policy under Bush Senior led a wallflower existence. It was 
marked by two events:  
· In 1989, in a secret resolution, the administration extended aid to Iraq, although 
by this time there were already increasing signs that the government of Saddam 
Hussein was working hard on a nuclear weapon project.
71
  
· While preparing for the NPT Review Conference, the agent responsible for the 
non-proliferation policy in the disarmaments body, Kathleen Bailey, declared that 
the USA would sooner leave the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) than 
agree to a test ban. 
At the NPT Review Conference itself, participants failed to reach agreement that the USA 
was doing too little too late in the test ban matter. Nevertheless, through pressure and 
conviction, all non-aligned states except for Mexico moved to accept the compromise 
formula to satisfy America. Mexico, on the other hand, would not give up her minimum 
demand of a clear declaration to introduce a test ban.
72
  
After 1990, – i.e., after the shocking realisations of Iraq’s nuclear weapon programme – 
the administration invested a lot more energy into non-proliferation, evidenced by two 
major political initiatives, the ”Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative” (Dec. 1990) 
with a decisive extension of export control and the ”Nonproliferation Initiative” (July 
1993). Important and new regional initiatives in the Middle East, Southern Asia and East-
ern Asia were introduced to encourage ”developing countries” to give up or at least to 
 
 
69 Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, Chronology of Key Events in the Effort to End Nuclear Weapons 
Testing: 1945-1999, http://www.clw.org/coalition/ctchro90.htm. 
70 Cf. Note 61, see also Peter Zheutlin, Nevada, U.S.S.R., Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 46, No. 2. 
March 1990. These include Greenpeace, Peace Action and Physicians for Social Responsibility. 
71  Matthias Dembinski, Weltordnung und Sicherheit. Amerikanische Nonproliferationspolitik nach dem 
Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts, in: Matthias, Dembinski/Peter Rudolf/Jürgen Wilzewski (eds.), Amerika-
nische Weltpolitik nach dem Ost-West-Konflikt, Baden-Baden (Nomos) 1994, pp. 307-348, here p. 317. 
72  David Fischer/Harald Müller,. A Treaty in Trouble. Europe and the NPT after the Fourth Review Con-
ference, Frankfurt (PRIF Reports No. 17) 1991. 
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freeze their nuclear weapon programmes. The Bush administration contributed actively in 
the resurrection of the group of nuclear supplier countries and played a considerable part 
in reviewing their guidelines and providing instruments in particular for stemming the 
dangerous transport of dual use goods. The administration also brought in an initiative to 
”overhaul” the International Atomic Energy Agency’s system of safeguards (IAEA), the 
inadequacy of which to discover secret nuclear activities had become apparent with the 
experiences in Iraq.
73
 Finally, the administration was partially responsible for the UN Se-
curity Council, in January 1992, asking to speak for the first time on the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction by means of a declaration. This declaration described the 
proliferation as ”a threat to international peace and security”, which permitted sanctions 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In so doing, the Bush administration had rein-
forced its role in the Security Council as protector of the non-proliferation regime.
74
 
As Bush fell in with the test moratorium towards the end of his office, the critical date 
of 1995 was announced, when the NPT would be tested at an ”Extension Conference” and 
at which the fate of this treaty so important for world order would be decided. 
Before then, however, another subject came to the fore: soon after the end of the Cold 
War, it became clear that new proliferation dangers were emerging from the ailing nuclear 
complex of the former Soviet Union: the enormous production apparatus could no longer 
be maintained with the available resources. The physical protection of many of the facili-
ties was completely inadequate, the wages of the formally privileged employees could no 
longer be paid, and as a consequence of the planned disarmament, large quantities of 
weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium could be expected to become 
readily available. Sooner or later – it was predicted – the theft of weapons-grade material 
would begin. The US administration reacted to warnings75 and tried to resolve the prob-
lem as quickly as possible with unilateral measures. In 1991, it launched the ”Nunn-
Lugar” programme – named after two senators. Its aim was to provide aid for Russia, the 
Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and others in the form of conversion, military contact, de-
contamination and enhanced physical protection. In 1992, after eight months of talks, the 
EU, the USA, Japan and Russia founded the International Science and Technology Centre. 
In 1993, it started work. Initially, there were difficulties and obstacles which were not 
overcome until years later. Financial transfers from the Nunn-Lugar programme were so 
slow at first – primarily because of the complicated and incompatible bureaucracies on 
both sides – that some of the money became invalid before it was even spent. The money 
was also only granted on the condition that it was only spent on American technology for 
all measures – a condition that caused incredible frustration for the Russians, since they 
 
 
73  Cf. Dembinski, loc.cit. (Note 71), pp. 324ff. 
74  PPNN Newsbrief 17, Spring 1992, p. 15. 
75 One of the first warning publications on this subject which had considerable influence on US policy was 
Kurt M. Campbell/Ashton B. Carter/Steven E. Miller/Charles A. Zrakte, Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control 
of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet Union, CSIA Studies in International Security, Cam-
bridge, 1991. 
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were very much in the position to provide much of the relevant technology themselves. 
This would also have secured jobs. 
2.4 Summary 
In summary it can be said that Bush’s arms control and non-proliferation policy were 
embedded in a moderate multilateralism.
76
 Such orientation was also evident from the fact 
that in the Gulf War in 1991 Bush sought a path via the UN Security Council. In this 
framework, the bilateral and multilateral regulation of the arms relationship was regarded 
as one controlled by several instruments for establishing a cooperative world order under 
American leadership. The Bush administration preferred negotiated, legally binding trea-
ties with detailed verification rules; under the pressure of time and as a concession to the 
Republican right wing, the administration also accepted non-binding commitment, as in 
the case of the mutual reduction and consolidation of tactical nuclear weapons during the 
crisis in and collapse of the Soviet Union, whereby a future change in policy remained 
clearly open. However, a certain self-limitation on one’s own freedom of action was also 
acceptable for the ”new world order” provided it remained in line with vital security in-
terests. An interested public and active non-government organisations supported the rela-
tively pro-arms control policy. In the final phase of the East-West conflict, the Americans 
devoted an unusually high amount of attention to foreign policy. 53% were very inter-
ested in foreign policy matters, 4% up on four years previously and 11% more than in 
1982. 18.8% stated foreign policy as the most important political problem. Nuclear arms 
control did well, too: 59% considered non-proliferation to be a relevant subject, and 53% 
global arms control.77 
However, the government was not prepared to make a fundamental U-turn in nuclear 
policy. Despite all the arms reductions, the cessation of arms programmes, and despite the 
readiness to take steps towards arms control under both START Treaties (see below), the 
nuclear posture of the USA has remained structurally the same. With the focus again 
turned to ”rogue states”, new roles for nuclear weapons emerged which threatened to 
compensate for the change in Bush’s nuclear weapons policy –quantitative reduction – 
through a qualitative expansion of nuclear strategy. All in all, despite the appearance of 
the spectacular treaties, policy has remained constant with the period before the end of 
the East-West conflict. 
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3. The Nuclear Policy of the Clinton Administration 
3.1 Foreign policy and security policy guidelines 
The Clinton administration had to deal with a pretty much unpredictable Russian partner 
increasingly dominated by the ill health of the president. Following the departure of For-
eign Minister Kosyrev, conservative or even restorative forces dominated the clearly in-
creasingly powerless Duma and Russia swung to a more nationalistic, geopolitically-
oriented policy harbouring greater anti-Western resentment. On the other hand, it was 
not to be ignored that Clinton, after an extremely multilateral beginning, had, by 1994, 
fallen into the unilateral line – under the pressure of Congress now dominated by conser-
vative Republicans. In parallel to this, the administration prioritised NATO above the 
OSCE and the United Nations and with much energy encouraged the recruitment of new 
NATO members fully aware that this would stretch the flexibility of its Russian partner 
too far and increase the tensions between them.
78
 
By the end of the Clinton administration, relations with Russia were very ambivalent. 
The USA did not see Russia as an enemy, but, like before, as a risk factor. She strove to-
wards cooperative relations, while at the same time challenging vital Russian interests – 
for example by pursuing geostrategic and energy interests in the Caucasus and in Central 
Asia. The conservative Republicans in Congress went further from a deep-seated prejudice 
to force the Clinton administration further in this direction.
79
 The fact that the Foreign 
Committee and the Defence Committee in the Senate were headed by two of the most 
chauvinistic ”dinosaurs”, Jesse Helms and Strom Thurmond, meant that the extreme 
wing of the majority party lost an overproportionate amount of influence. The ambivalent 
tension was even more evident in relations with China. The concessions made to the Tai-
wan lobby (for example, authorisation for an ”unofficial” visit from the Taiwanese presi-
dent) reflected partly the views of the administration itself, and partly the pressure from 
the pro-Taiwan Republicans in Congress. Since this was always causing difficulties with 
Peking, a constant eye was kept on the deterrence role of the USA in East Asia by the 
strategists.
80
 
While Russia and China continued to be noted in American strategic arsenal, the 
”rogue states” – in direct connection with the debates in the last stage of the Bush admini-
stration – marched straight into the centre of strategic thinking. Constitutive of this cate-
gory is the non-democratic, totalitarian, dictatorial character of these regimes, their con-
tempt for the values represented by the United States and the West as a whole. Based on 
this categorisation, they take the place of communist Soviet Union in the maniacal pattern 
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of interpretation of the world which so dominates American political culture.
81
 This posi-
tion is important because, in deterring and defending against evil, a return to an equiva-
lent evil (nuclear weapons) becomes justifiable; they contrast with the aim declared more 
adamantly under Clinton than under Bush, of expanding democracy in the world and 
hence expanding the area of peace and stability.
82
 
The totalitarian characteristic is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a regime to 
be classified as a rogue state. There is also the element of dangerousness: ”rogue states” 
threaten basic American interests, possess weapons of mass destruction or strive to and 
they support terrorism. These features compress themselves into an interpretation syn-
drome that characterises them as antagonists and a complete danger to democracies.
83
 
Early on, leading members of the Clinton administration made it clear that the contain-
ment, deterrence and – if necessary – the combating of ”rogue states” took a central role 
in their diplomacy as well in their military strategy.
84
 For the ”Two Wars Strategy” (which 
was adopted after a brief debate on a ”One-and-a-half War Strategy”) taken over from 
Bush, this, together with the experiences of the Gulf War, brought about an urgent need 
to deal with the possibility of a threat from weapons of mass destruction in regional mili-
tary disputes. The reply came in the form of the ”Defense Counterproliferation Initiative” 
(DCI) first announced at the end of 1993. It was connected with the Presidential Guide-
line PDD-13 which wanted to integrate non-proliferation as a military means and defined 
objective of the administration with conventional diplomatic and overseas economic in-
struments (export controls).
85
 
At first, DCI caused considerable irritation in Europe, since Europe had got the im-
pression that multilateral non-proliferation diplomacy should be superseded by military 
prevention – a line which should have been implemented under Bush Junior. DCI was 
made up of research and procurement projects for passive protection against the NBC 
threat (protective clothing, sensors, vaccinations); active protection (tactical missile de-
fence); projects for developing conventional pre-emption means (munitions with the 
ability to penetrate and destroy underground positions and with high detonation tem-
peratures for the reliable destruction of B and C weapons). 
The DCI also marked the beginning of a change in the foreign policy strategy of the 
administration. To start with, with the ”expansion strategy” it had made a declared belief 
in multilateralism. The strategy consciously intensified the potential in Bush’s ”new world 
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order” to implement a project of increasing legitimisation of international relations al-
ready followed by President Wilson in 1918 (and which had failed due to the refusal by 
the senate at the time to ratify the League of Nations mandate).
86
 This multilateralism was 
however, not really an established priority in the thinking of the administration, since the 
security gains achieved through arms control and security policy institutionalisation 
scarcely played a part in public opinion.
87
 Under the increasing pressure of the conserva-
tive Republicans (especially in Congress) more and more unilateralism became mixed 
into Clinton’s policy.
88
 Republican military expert, Paul Wolfowitz, accused him, early in 
1994, of not translating correct knowledge of Iraq into more energetic, and, if necessary, 
unilateral military action.
89
 At the end of 1993, ex-defence minister Cheney demanded 
Saddam Hussein be removed now rather than in five or ten years time.
90
 Richard Haass, 
another Republican with senior functions in both Bush administrations, in 1994 de-
manded pre-emptive military strikes on the nuclear plants in North Korea.
91
 The DCI 
fitted in as one of the first elements in this way of thinking.  
On top of that, was the return of public interest to arms control. The intensity with 
which the media regarded the subject abated, together with the financial contributions to 
non-government organisations.92 The proportion of the public who considered themselves 
”very interested” in foreign news slipped back slightly from 53% to 50%. The trend was 
clearer in the question concerning the country’s most important problem: where four 
years before, almost 19% stated foreign policy, now it was only 11.8%. Dramatically, 
where we’re concerned, was the fact that arms control, previously identified by more than 
50% of people as an important foreign policy objective, no longer figured among the ten 
subjects considered relevant, although the proportion of those who described non-
proliferation as ”very important” had climbed to 81%. However, this does not point to a 
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drop in the multilateral tendency of the Americans, since 53% thought the United Na-
tions should be strengthened, 10% more than in 1990.93 
3.2 Nuclear strategy under Clinton: the Nuclear Posture Review 
The new threat analysis and the central position of the ”rogue states” as potential military 
opponents had long-term effects on nuclear strategy and the positioning of nuclear weap-
ons (and nuclear arms control and non-proliferation) in the USA’s strategic arsenal: the 
arguments against missile defence became weaker, the more actual or potential advance-
ments could be put under the control of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile 
programmes in the incriminated states.
94
 Nuclear weapons increasingly assumed the role 
of a generalised means of deterrence against these states, which undermined the hitherto 
unconditional guarantee of non-nuclear weapon states and meant that these states could 
not be threatened nor attacked with nuclear means. Nuclear weapons as pre-emptive 
means of warfare against WMD stocks in ”rogue states” entered increasingly into the de-
bate, which gave argumentative impetus to the wishes of nuclear laboratories to work on 
new warhead designs. In a comprehensive strategy of ”Selective Engagement”, in which 
the USA would have to defend her most vital geopolitical interests, if necessary with 
weapons, and possibly fight a war in East Asia (North Korea) and a war in the Persian 
Gulf at the same time, made this deterrent function more important.
95
 
President Clinton’s first defence minister Aspin introduced the most ambitious at-
tempt at a fundamental change to American nuclear strategy, plus the size, composition 
and alert status of nuclear forces.
96
 The Nuclear Posture Review commissioned in autumn 
1993 was headed by the head of department from the defence minister’s office, Ashton 
Carter, a Harvard scientist and arms control expert, who – like his employer – aimed at a 
fundamental change to the policy inherited from the Cold War. Appropriate to the end of 
the Cold War, he especially wanted to develop a purely second strike strategy. The 
capability of counter-attack directly on receipt of a warning, before aerial warheads could 
be detonated, would be given up. The intention failed. Six workgroups comprising 
intermediate officer ranks were given assignments which they completed in the sense of 
the handed-down policy. Carter’s deputy, nuclear strategy veteran Frank Miller, worked 
hard at keeping any innovations to a minimum. He considered Russia’s democratisation 
still too unstable to justify any bold changes in American nuclear doctrine. For, as long as 
Russia was still not clearly settled in the democratic camp, Russian intentions were still 
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not sufficiently trustworthy, to do without a robust counterforce arsenal, which in the 
event of war would be able to eliminate the greater part of the Russian nuclear weapon 
arsenal.
97
 
The Pentagon bureaucracy ignored the original directive to involve a ”control group” 
comprising external experts. When Carter himself in a moment of doubt engaged two 
external disarmament experts to develop alternative options and was about to pass their 
study – together with the officially prepared version of the status quo – upwards, there 
was a revolt among the military bureaucracy. The joint chiefs and the commander in chief 
of strategic command vigorously turned against the ”radical” proposals of the outsiders 
who had set their target on abolishing land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, the 
abandonment of high alert as well as the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from Europe. 
The main argument concerned procedure: it would be improper to develop alternative 
options for American nuclear policy bypassing the appointed military committees. This 
disavowing of civil control and the practical ban on alternative thinking (this is precisely 
what the now resigned Les Aspin had wanted to achieve!) annulled basic principles of 
democratic government in the highly sensitive area of defence policy of all places. 
98
 
The military command brought their reservations to the attention of the conservative 
defence politicians in the Senate who played out the differences between the civilian and 
military command politically against the administration.
99
 In view of these circumstances, 
the risk of following Carter’s starting points further appeared too great to the political 
leadership. When the Nuclear Posture Review was published, it confirmed the status quo: 
The uncertainties of the Russian reform process meant that the ability to respond imme-
diately to nuclear attack had to be maintained and a broad spectrum of military targets 
covered. This required, furthermore, the triad of bombers, intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles and submarine-launched missiles; on top of this, the maintenance of a reserve of 
warheads was required, in order to ”reconstitute” an essentially bigger arsenal through the 
reloading of bombers and multiple warhead missiles, if necessary. The document rejected 
disarmament beyond the thresholds of START II. The review also touched on the possible 
use of nuclear weapons against ”small” nuclear weapon states, states with nuclear weapon 
programmes and states under surveillance which had acquired biological or chemical 
weapons.
100
 Therefore, on the occasion of the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty in 1995, it avoided the explicitly repeated assurance that nuclear 
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weapons would not be used against non-nuclear weapon states. In connection with the 
American entry to the Treaty on the Nuclear Weapon-free Zone in Africa (the Pelindaba 
Treaty) a member of the National Security Council clarified that international law permit-
ted proportional retaliation in the event of a hostile use of weapons of mass destruction; 
in such a case, the American assurance would no longer be legally valid.
101
 
It is true that the Presidential Decision Directive 60 (1997) modified the results of the 
Nuclear Posture Review to the extent that it gave up the policy of ”victory in a drawn-out 
nuclear war” established under Reagan and reduced the number of warheads necessary for 
American security to 2,000-2,500; the triad structure was, however, maintained and the 
potentially pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons against ”proliferators” further confirmed 
and specified.
102
 The same conservatism found expression a year later in an authoritative 
analysis conducted by a task force of the Defence Science Board (Pentagon). The board 
dismissed the task of the strategic triad (especially land-based intercontinental ballistic 
missiles) as well as a reduction in the level of alertness as rash and possibly destabilising.
103
 
There were more reasons in the Clinton administration for maintaining a nuclear 
weapon arsenal with several thousand warheads: they ranged from the need ”to threaten a 
broad spectrum of values rated by potentially hostile nations” more explicitly Russia, 
China and ”a few” potential proliferators
104
 to an insurance against ”an uncertain future”, 
for which such an insurance required ”a wide spectrum of retaliation options”.
105
 The fact 
that other countries could see themselves invited into less comfortable security situations 
and without the advantage of an exemplary military superiority, at the same time, in sup-
port of the American example, provided themselves with weapons of mass destruction as 
a means of deterrence as an ”insurance against an uncertain future” (and what future 
would not be uncertain?), did not occur to the American military planners. 
3.3 Nuclear arms control policy 
Where the Nuclear Posture Review was concerned, there was relative unity within the 
administration over the controlled progress of nuclear arms control: it wanted to imple-
ment START I and ratify START II. Ratification was delayed, however, until 1996, since 
the responsible committee chairman in the Senate, Jesse Helms, took the treaty ”hostage” 
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in order to force reorganisation in the foreign ministry and speed up the missile defence 
projects. A second priority was the test ban, but the opposition in the laboratories was not 
completely silenced and continued to provide the conservatives in Congress with ammu-
nition. The administration also pursued a production ban on fissile material for use in 
weapons (cutoff). The disarmament aid for the successor states of the Soviet Union also 
enjoyed the support of Congress across party borders. 
3.3.1 Test ban – from rigorous efforts to helpless failure 
When Clinton entered office, the test moratorium and the development ban for new nu-
clear weapons already existed (cf. Section 2.3.3). His administration took over – as an-
nounced in the election battle – the arguments in support of a CTBT and in so doing, 
introduced a fundamental swing in US policy.106 The role of tests as a deterrence had be-
come obsolete and new types of nuclear weapons should also not be developed. This was 
also expressly established in the Nuclear Posture Review 1994. 
However, the government particularly saw a CTBT as an important means of reinforc-
ing the non-proliferation regime: in 1995, the extension conference of the NPT was due to 
take place (cf. Section 3.1). For the Clinton government, this represented the core of all 
non-proliferation initiatives, and – together with Russia and the European allies – it 
fought for its indefinite extension.107 For a broad consensus of the non-aligned states, too, 
which comprised over half the member states, it saw – quite rightly – a concluded, or at 
least an almost completely negotiated CTBT as key to disarmament. It also saw the posi-
tive effects of the CTBT for non-proliferation, since it would take the opportunity away 
from proliferating countries – new and old – of testing and further developing the ability 
of their warheads. The states at which these considerations were aimed were non-
members in particular of the NPT, who were suspected of possessing nuclear weapons – 
India, Pakistan and Israel.108 
Clinton extended the test moratorium several times despite the Chinese test in October 
1993. He also decided to keep to the schedule put forward by Congress: a CTBT should be 
negotiated by September 1996 at the latest. The preceding government had left the option 
open of conducting a few more tests to improve the security of the warheads, but he de-
clined to do this, against the will of the conservative Congress circles. However, the ad-
ministration did not play down the further importance of the nuclear weapon arsenal, in 
fact it stressed it.109 
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This pro-treaty attitude can be attributed to the persistent activities of a multitude of 
test ban opponents. Their protests also achieved a really ”comprehensive” treaty: In April 
1993, it was announced that the Clinton administration was developing a plan for a 
threshold treaty with a low test threshold of one kilo tonne, which was preferred over the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This caused a wave of indignation. The protests included 
a number of different organisations: the Physicians for Social Responsibility, Greenpeace 
and various senators. 46 leading newspapers supported a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
This eventually caused the Clinton administration to give up the plans for a threshold 
treaty.110 It endeavoured in bilateral contact as well as within the framework of the Geneva 
Conference of Disarmament (CD) to reach a speedy and successful conclusion to the 
sluggish CTBT talks. In fact, talks began in January 1994.111 
To appease the domestic lobby from the weapon laboratories, the administration 
made, admittedly, far-reaching concessions: these included the further dismantling of the 
test site, for which they set aside 1.5 billion US dollars in October 1995, and the ”Stockpile 
Stewardship Programme”, which provided for comprehensive experiments to replace the 
nuclear tests and furthermore guarantee the safety and working order of the warheads. 
The essential parts of the programme included the laser fusion aided by the ”National 
Ignition Facility”, the costs of which alone ran to over 2 billion US dollars, hydrodynamic 
experiments, further simulation experiments and tests of components.112 The Stockpile 
Stewardship Programme was set up in 1994 and supported in the following years with 
funds of several billion dollars a year. Critics have asked the question whether such enor-
mous expense did not also serve to undermine the spirit of the Test Ban Treaty which 
carried the option of developing new nuclear weapons in the future.  
This fear was reinforced by the fact that the USA with the other nuclear weapon states 
were again entering into talks over a test threshold, although this was scarcely compatible 
with the objective of a comprehensive test ban. The dispute revolved around the extent of 
the threshold, which ranged from just a few kilograms of TNT (USA) to several hundred 
tonnes (France). Even small nuclear tests, as initially desired by the USA, would have 
opened up far-reaching technical possibilities of further development and would have 
gone against the spirit of the treaty.  
As a reaction to the protests against the French tests, the French made a surprising U-
turn: on 10 August 1995, President Chirac announced that France now supported a ban 
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on ”all nuclear explosions”. The members of the CD interpreted this as a ”zero option”, 
which also included a ban on tests with very small energy release. A day later, President 
Clinton signed up to the zero option; the others followed later. Assumedly, it would never 
have come so far if France had not been under so much pressure on account of her tests.113  
In its dual function as a disarmament treaty and non-proliferation treaty, the CTBT 
offered a basic source of conflict during the talks. The US delegation – like the other nu-
clear weapon states – attached importance to stressing the components of non-
proliferation and playing down disarmament, e.g. in proposed texts for the preamble. 
This provoked the non-aligned states, all of which rejected the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty led by India who, as a state which had once carried out a nuclear explosion, felt its 
status neglected. The dispute intensified in the commencement clause which provided 
that the 44 already named states, including all nuclear weapon states and India, must rat-
ify the treaty. India declared that she did not want to do this under any circumstances. 
Nobody reckoned on the fact that a few years later, the USA of all countries would herself 
appear on the list of those refusing to ratify the treaty.114  
In September 1999, the first special conference of the member states to speed up ratifi-
cation took place. However, it had no legal means by which to force commencement of 
the treaty. Shortly after, on 13 October 1999, the US Senate voted on ratification of the 
CTBT. Owing to internal political disputes, voting was postponed time and again.115 Con-
trary to the hopes of many observers, the Senate refused to give consent by a majority of 
52 to 48. 67 votes were what was required. The Senate’s consultation time was just 13 
days. To understand this result, we need to look closely at the events of the preceding 
months.  
The Chairman of the Foreign Committee, Jesse Helms, a conservative Republican and 
bitter opponent of the CTBT had a crucial influence in the result. When, on 23 Septem-
ber, Clinton submitted the treaty to the Senate for consultation and ratification, Helms 
also demanded the submission of two other treaties – the Protocol to the ABM Treaty and 
the Protocol to the Kyoto Climate Agreement, neither of which had anything to do with 
the CTBT. Otherwise, the committee would not concern itself with the CTBT. The sup-
porters of the CTBT in the Senate, who held the majority, had no legal basis on which to 
 
 
113 Whether Chirac really meant a zero option with his declaration, will, supposedly, and must never be 
clarified. But the declaration was interpreted that way in press declarations immediately after, and also 
by the then German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel. 
114 For details of the talks see Rebecca Johnson, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: The Endgame, 
ACRONYM Report No.9, 1996, http://www.acronym.org.uk/acrorep/acro9.htm; Rebecca Johnson, A 
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http://www.acronym.org.uk/acrorep/acro10.htm; see also Schaper, loc.cit. (Note 108). 
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influence this decision. Thus, in principle, a single senator was able to block ratification 
against the will of the majority.  
At the end of September 1999, Helms and the conservative Senator Lott, the leader of 
the majority in the Senate, abruptly changed course and put the treaty up for voting with-
out delay on 7 October. A wave of protest on the part of a number of senators and non-
government organisations had led to this change in course as well as an attempt by the 
democrats to bring about a non-binding agreement on the CTBT.116 Now, of course, the 
time for the necessary hearings and debate was far too short. Negotiations to delay the 
voting date failed – Lott was not prepared to offer a later date. The Senate’s procedural 
rules gave the leader of the majority and the committee opportunities to manipulate and 
undermine the will of the majority.  
Both sides now began to lobby the 20-25 still undecided senators intensely. It was only 
now that the administration made serious attempts to explain the importance and advan-
tages of a CTBT. It also sought the help of non-government organisations at the same 
time. Within a short time, following petitions from hundreds of organisations, experts 
and former military personnel and a wealth of newspaper editorials, the CTBT achieved a 
great deal of publicity.117 Yet, it could not make up for the lost time and many of the sena-
tors allowed themselves to be convinced by opponents to the CTBT that further nuclear 
tests were necessary in order to maintain a capacity for deterrence – an argument that 
could be refuted by experts but not forced through to the decision-makers. When it be-
came clear that the CTBT would not win a majority, a few senators even tried to push 
back the vote indefinitely – but to no avail. 
The failure was not just attributable to the tricks of a few Republican senators in lead-
ing positions and the power of these positions. The Clinton administration also neglected 
to organise a campaign in time which would have led to a broad discussion and particu-
larly more information and clarification being given on the background and motive for a 
CTBT. Clinton could have set up an office responsible solely for ratification of the CTBT. 
But Clinton had been too distracted by internal politics, his own scandals and the war in 
Kosovo.  
Following the Senate’s decision, Clinton announced that the USA would nevertheless 
comply with the provisions of the treaty. In the following years, the Americans repeatedly 
conducted so-called subcritical tests. These concerned experiments with smaller amounts 
of fissile material, which would not trigger any self-preserving chain reaction. These ex-
periments are not really suitable for the development of new nuclear weapons and do not 
come under the terms of the ban set out in the CTBT. But owing to the fact that they were 
conducted underground, that the government invested billions in the maintenance of the 
 
 
116 In 1996, the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers began to lobby intensely for the ratification of the 
CTBT. The Coalition was founded in 1995 and consisted of 14 think tanks and activist groups. See 
http://www.clw.org/coalition/index.html. 
117 America's Newspaper Editors Back Test Ban Treaty, Pt. 6: ”Calls for Ratification Overwhelming”, Coali-
tion to Reduce Nuclear Dangers Issue Brief, 12 October 1999. 
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test site and failed to clarify the nature of the experiments, they led of immense mistrust 
and protest worldwide.118 The mood in international negotiation committees, such as the 
CD, had therefore turned sour long before the failed ratification. 
Even the assurance not to develop any new warheads was increasingly doubted inter-
nationally, since the government was putting a lot of effort into a new nuclear earth-
penetrating warhead. It concerned a modification of the B61 bomb (B61-11). The war-
head itself is not new, just the casing is a new development of hardened steel which bores 
deep into the earth through its kinetic energy and hardness. 
3.3.2 Cutoff – from hopeful beginnings to paralysing blockade 
In connection with the negotiations surrounding the CTBT, the CD also aimed to negoti-
ate a treaty banning the production of nuclear material for nuclear weapon purposes, 
known as ”cutoff”.119 In 1995, such a treaty – like the CTBT – was also explicitly estab-
lished as a disarmament aim in the Principles and Objectives of the NPT review confer-
ences. Whereas the function of the CTBT is to end the qualitative arms race, i.e., to put a 
stop to the development of new types of nuclear weapons, the cutoff can be seen as its 
quantitative counterpart, limiting the quantity of weapon material. Gorbachov proposed 
it in 1989, but Bush had rejected it. Nevertheless, by 1992 he had announced the end of 
American production, together with the end of all further development programmes for 
new nuclear warheads (cf. Section 2.3.3).120 
Clinton, on the other hand, made a proposal to the UN General Assembly on 27 Sep-
tember 1993 to ban the production of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium 
for nuclear warheads or plutonium outside international security measures.121 In January 
1994, the CD included cutoff on its agenda and in March 1995 agreed on a negotiation 
mandate.122 The delegations struggled with the formulation of this mandate, since they 
feared that the formulation could anticipate the negotiating positions: the USA and the 
 
 
118 The Japanese, allies of the USA and others also protested: Associated Press, Japan condemns US test,  
27 September 1998. 
119 Annette Schaper, A Treaty on the Cutoff of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons – What to Cover? 
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120 George Bush, Statement on Nuclear Nonproliferation Efforts, 13 July 1992. http://bushlibrary.tamu. 
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other nuclear weapon states wanted to ban future production, many others also wanted 
already produced material included in some way, these included the non-aligned states, 
but also some Western non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear-weapon-owning Pakistan, 
who wanted clarification of India’s nuclear material stocks.123 The mandate (”Shannon 
Mandate”) was therefore ambiguously formulated so that each delegation could interpret 
it in their own way. As early as this dispute, it could be seen that the cutoff – like the 
CTBT – would not be free of conflict between non-proliferation and disarmament.  
At a number of conferences on the subject of cutoff and during consultations, dele-
gates from the USA made it clear that their – own – interest lay quite clearly in the 
integration of the three states possessing nuclear weapon – India, Pakistan and Israel, i.e., 
in non-proliferation. India would never accept the inclusion of already produced material 
– an assessment confirmed by the Indian delegation – therefore, the USA would also ex-
clude it from the mandate.124 She would decide herself on her own fissile material stocks – 
this was not a subject for international negotiation. Of course, the cutoff could only enter 
into force if was ratified by all nuclear weapon states plus the three possessing nuclear 
weapons, precisely like the CTBT. 
But even excluding already existing material, a cutoff would have been important not 
just for non-proliferation but also for disarmament: verification measures were intro-
duced into the nuclear complexes of the nuclear weapon state. Such transparency would 
help prepare for the verification of nuclear disarmament and introduce a worldwide sys-
tem of international safeguards.125 The position of the Americans regarding verification of 
a cutoff was clear early on: it should not go beyond the absolute minimum necessary. The 
idea of orienting verification measures around the international security measures of the 
IAEA was already rejected by representatives of the US government.126 
However, it did not get as far as talks. India – angered at the way the CTBT talks had 
developed (cf. Section 3.3.1) – bound her consent to the setting up of an ad-hoc commit-
tee with the simultaneous start of talks on a world free of nuclear weapons. This deal was 
categorically rejected by the USA, as well as proposed compromises from other delega-
tions, such as a ”discussion forum on nuclear disarmament”; although increasingly more 
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124 See e.g. Fred McGoldrick: Scope of a Fissile Material Cutoff and Verification Approaches, Working 
Paper, U.S. Department of State, November 1995. See also: Michael Guhin, Arms Control and Disar-
mament Agency, Remarks on Negotiating an End to Fissile Material Production, 7th Carnegie Interna-
tional Non-Proliferation Conference 11-12 January 1999, Washington, D.C., http://www.ceip.org/ 
files/events/Conf99Guhin.asp? 
125 A. Schaper, The Case for Universal Full Scope Safeguards on Nuclear Material, The Nonproliferation 
Review, Vol. 5, No 2, p. 69, Winter 1998; Schaper, loc.cit. (Note 119). 
126 See McGoldrick, loc.cit. (Note 124); Guhin, loc.cit. (Note 124). See also Jonathan Sanborn, FMCT 
Verification at Reprocessing and Enrichment Plants, Presentation at the FMCT Workshop, 14-15 May 
2001, Palais des Nations, Geneva. 
30 Harald Müller/Annette Schaper 
 
 
delegations came to the opinion that this subject could not be avoided.127 Thus, the CD 
blocked itself and fossilised into paralysing inactivity.  
The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in spring 1998 had the paradoxical effect of giv-
ing the appearance that the CD had got moving again. India, who now saw herself as a 
nuclear weapon state, appeared to give way.128 In August 1998, the CD agreed to set up a 
negotiating committee based on the Shannon mandate. The hope proved, however, to be 
false, since the start of talks was adjourned to the next year. Meanwhile, new conditions 
emerged: China, who until then had supported cutoff talks, now demanded the parallel 
appointment of a committee to negotiate on the Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space 
(PAROS). This idea had been motivated by American missile defence plans and discus-
sions on the ABM Treaty. The USA, however, rejected such talks. It also became clear that 
the administration had lost interest in cutoff as Clinton’s term in office came to an end. It 
failed to develop any new initiatives or considerations, and agents concerned with the 
subject were given other areas to work in. American non-government organisations con-
tinued to remain passive in the matter. 
3.3.3 CTR – to improve the safety of the Russian nuclear complex 
The collapsed Soviet Union left behind an enormous nuclear weapon complex, concerned 
with the development, production and maintenance of nuclear weapons (cf. Section 
2.3.4). The cooperation programme brought to life by the Bush government and sup-
ported by the DoD (Department of Defence) which aimed to reduce these dangers (Co-
operative Threat Reduction, CTR) and which served disarmament as well as non-
proliferation, was expanded considerably by the Clinton administration. Its job was to 
cooperate with the successor states of the Soviet Union based on several objectives:129 
· To improve the safety of warheads through storage away from conflict zones,  
· to register and inventarise these warheads carefully,  
· to improve their safety in the event of an accident,  
· to disarm and dismantle these warheads safely,  
· to help in the social support and reemployment of weapons scientists to prevent 
these from moving to third countries,  
· to expand military contact between the USA and the successor states,  
· to convert production facilities to commercial use, 
· to remove radiation damage from the environment, especially in the Arctic.  
 
 
127 Rebecca Johnson, Frustration That the CD Isn’t Working, Disarmament Diplomacy - Issue Nr 34, 
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129 William Potter/John Shields, Assessing the Dismantlement Process, in: W. Potter/J. Shields (eds.), 
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Supporters of the CTR Programme extolled it as a worthwhile investment in US security. 
After Clinton came to office, it continued to move slowly at first. In 1995, only 150 
million of the 1.2 billion dollars set aside since 1991 had been spent.130 There were several 
reasons for this: firstly, it bothered some of the decision-makers in the administration that 
it had been started by the preceding government. They did not oppose it, but they lacked 
enthusiasm. The second reason lay with the bureaucracies of the cooperating partner who 
were scarcely compatible with each other. On the American side, the allocation proce-
dures moved forward ever so slowly – suffocated by complicated guidelines. On the side 
of the recipient states, especially Russia, a restrictive information and access policy to sen-
sitive sites blocked progress. The third and final reason lay in the fact that the allocated 
funds had to be stretched to other activities of the DoD – and that was bound up with 
internal distribution battles. So, the frustrations and resistance to the CTR Programme 
and its unsatisfactory implementation grew in the USA and in the recipient countries. 
These frustrations were intensified on the American side by the radical deferment of 
political priorities as a consequence of the Congress elections in autumn 1994. These elec-
tions brought some declared opponents of foreign aid in general and of aid for the former 
Soviet Union in particular to power. As a consequence of the change in personnel and the 
motto ”America first”, some components of the activities were deleted altogether, others 
were transferred by the DoD to other ministries. The original optimism gave way more 
and more to scepticism and disillusionment. The delay in important market economy 
reforms in Russia, the emergence of nationalistic groups and the rehabilitation of the 
Communist Party, the antidemocratic measures of President Yeltsin and rumours of the 
continued development of Russian biological weapons also contributed. On the Russian 
side, too, the readiness to cooperate waned. The reasons included NATO expansion, 
American criticism of the Russian export of reactor technology to Iran, the Chechen cam-
paign and detailed and incomprehensible controls on individual projects on the part of 
the Americans. This bred further mistrust of America’s intentions with the cooperation, 
i.e., suspicion of espionage. In particular, it disturbed partners in projects that it was al-
ways the US companies that won the lucrative jobs and not the Russian competitors who 
often put forward more favourable offers. This meant that the Russians missed out on the 
chance of creating thousands of jobs in a sector which due to nuclear disarmament and 
Russian budget problems was suffering from serious underemployment.  
It is true that the administration continued to hold that cooperation with Russia in the 
disarmament of weapons of mass destruction was in American security interests, but the 
critical votes in and outside the government were growing.131 There were, however, influ-
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ential supporters in Congress, motivated and led by Senator Sam Nunn, who protected 
the CTR Programme from further cuts. 
Major progress was made despite all the difficulties. The Clinton administration ex-
tended the CTR and initiated a raft of additional projects. The DoE took overall control of 
all projects concerning MPC&A (material protection, control & accountancy) in the most 
sensitive nuclear facilities. At the government level, the department cooperated directly 
with the Russian energy ministry (Minatom). It became apparent that projects run a lot 
more successfully, when they circumvent bureaucracies and scientists can work together 
directly. To this end, the laboratories of the DoE, especially Los Alamos, Livermore and 
Sandia, stepped up cooperation with the relevant Russian research organisations – with 
great success. The State Department took over the job of promoting projects aimed at 
improving the export controls of sensitive technologies. 
Other Western governments also participated.132 The collaboration in the International 
Technology Centre in Moscow, that promotes civil projects of former nuclear weapons 
scientists (and other WMD scientists) to stop them from emigrating and spreading their 
sensitive knowledge, enjoys particular success. From 1992-2000 it was funded with almost 
half a billion US dollars, of which 38.5% came from the USA, 31.3 % from Japan and the 
rest from other industrial countries. Over 11,500 Russian scientists profited from ISTC.133 
Over the years, the cooperation partners learnt from their initial mistakes. 
An important area of activity is the disposal of superfluous nuclear material from nu-
clear weapons – highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium. Where HEU was con-
cerned, a pragmatic solution offered itself: it could be processed into non-weapon-grade 
reactor fuel and used commercially. For plutonium, however, there is no simple solution. 
Studies into this problem already started to appear at the start of the 1990’s. The first 
study, which was a standard for all further policy, came from the US National Academy of 
Sciences (NAS).134 It systematically defined criteria for evaluating options, in particular 
one that aims to describe the degree of disarmament. It is called the ”spent fuel standard” 
and since then has been used by the US government in all decisions regarding the disposal 
of plutonium. Since then, the disposal of plutonium has remained a prominent item on 
the disarmament agenda. In contrast, the disposal of HEU has hitherto been given too 
little attention, although it represents a major proliferation problem due to the far greater 
volumes, the long disposal periods and especially due to its simpler technical manageabil-
ity. 
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Although other disarmament initiatives by all other US administrations, i.e., the 
START process, the disarmament of tactical nuclear weapons and CTR at sensitive facili-
ties, continue to be limited to bilateral cooperation with Russia, in the disarmament of 
plutonium, the Clinton government strove for more internationality for one simple rea-
son: it turned out that all kinds of plutonium disposal, especially the single realistic one, 
i.e., processing the material into reactor fuel, were very expensive. The costs are estimated 
at 2-3 billion US dollars.135 In September 2000, six years after the NAS study, the USA and 
Russia concluded an agreement concerning the disposal of plutonium despite their differ-
ing opinions on nuclear energy policy,136 which took into account the support of a third 
party. Nevertheless, the treaty initially only provided for bilateral verification. It is true 
that it does not exclude possible internationalisation through the inclusion of the IAEA, 
such realisation, however, is non-binding.137 Some of the governments approached (in 
particular the G8) still had the effects of a future cutoff treaty in mind, since they wanted 
more transparency and rapid internationalisation of the verification process. However, 
this found little accommodation among the two nuclear superpowers.138  
3.3.4 Transparency – essential for more credible nuclear disarmament 
Progress in nuclear disarmament will depend on whether the nuclear weapons and –
complex and disarmament-relevant information becomes more transparent. Steps, such 
as the disarmament of additional warheads or the disposal of excess weapon material are 
more convincing, the more credible and transparent their verification. However, large 
areas of this information are still subject to secrecy in the nuclear weapon states, even in 
the USA. 
In December 1993, the then German Foreign Minister Kinkel proposed a nuclear 
weapon register to the United Nations.139 This proposal – an element of Kinkel’s 10-point 
initiative – would have been a logical consequence of the unilateral disarmament of tacti-
cal nuclear weapons, which the USA and the former Soviet Union had announced but 
 
 
135 Annette Schaper, Deutsche Abrüstungshilfe für russisches Waffenplutonium – Ein Plädoyer, in: Rein-
hard Mutz et al. (eds.), Friedensgutachten 2001, Münster (Lit-Verlag) 2001, p. 283. 
136 Text on the Internet under: http://twilight.saic.com/md/docs/pudispagree.pdf. 
137 It is unlikely that the necessary means will happen in the foreseeable future, see Schaper, loc.cit. (Note 
135). 
138 IAEA controls of disarmament plutonium were promised for many years by the nuclear weapon states 
and called for by the international community. Examples are: a common position held by the G-8 dur-
ing the Moscow Summit in 1996 (Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit Declaration, April 20, 
1996), a joint paper from the P5 at the NPT Inspection Conference in May 2000 (Letter dated 1 May 
2000 from the representatives of France, the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America addressed to 
the President of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, NPT/Conf.2000/21) and a paper by the EU Council at the same Inspection Confer-
ence (Council Common Position of 13 April 2000 relating to the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties 
to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Official Journal L 097 , 19/04/2000 p. 0001 
(Document 400X0297). 
139 UN General Assembly, 48th Session, First Committee, Agenda item 71 (c), 8 November 1993. 
34 Harald Müller/Annette Schaper 
 
 
lacked any transparency (cf. Section 2.3.2.). The nuclear weapon states rejected Kinkel’s 
proposal, however. The rejection, even by the Americans, was surprising since it had been 
expected that the Clinton administration would strike a different course to his predeces-
sors.140 Even now, the United States preferred to offer transparency in the area of nuclear 
disarmament only on a voluntary basis – for example, within the framework of the NPT 
inspection process – and not to undertake any binding commitments. 
In contrast, the American and Russian governments sought for more transparency in 
nuclear disarmament bilaterally.141 The verification of the START Treaties only provided 
for the destruction of the carriers, but not those of warheads, since, in the view of both 
sides, the latter would disclose too much sensitive information. In 1994, they imple-
mented the first initiative for the transparency of warheads and material, the ”Safeguards, 
Transparency, and Irreversibility (STI) Initiative”, aimed at a ”specific agreement”. They 
promised to exchange detailed information on stocks of warheads and nuclear material, 
their physical protection and safety.142 The following talks, in autumn 1995, failed how-
ever. Nevertheless, both sides did not give up efforts, instead they shifted them to the co-
operation between the weapons laboratories which were jointly researching how to verify 
the dismantling of nuclear warheads without exposing sensitive information at the same 
time. This successful cooperation ultimately led to the joint declaration by Clinton and 
Yeltsin at the Helsinki Summit in 1997 for a future START III treaty, in which they prom-
ised ”measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and 
the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads...”.143 
Both sides also worked towards international transparency. They began talks with the 
IAEA with the aim of putting nuclear material from nuclear disarmament under the con-
trol of the IAEA’s verification measures. These talks became known as the ”Trilateral Ini-
tiative”.144 They wanted to evoke confidence that steps in nuclear disarmament really were 
irreversible. The talks were slow and drawn-out but were carried on beyond the Clinton 
administration. 
Alongside these international activities and as part of its declared policy of openness, 
the Clinton administration seriously practised and engaged itself more in internal trans-
parency, putting itself far ahead of all other nuclear weapon states: at the end of 1993, as 
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part of this openness, the DoE set up various consultation committees, which examined 
the principles along which secrecy or publication would be decided.145 In June 1998, new 
guidelines on the confidentiality of information came into being as a result of the advice 
from these committees.146 The public should have the opportunity to make their own po-
litical judgements, especially in the areas of the environment, safety, health and pure sci-
ences.147 Information, the publication of which, however, would jeopardise ”national secu-
rity”, should remain secret. This classification should follow comprehensible and trans-
parent rules. Abuse, e.g. secrecy in order to cover corruption or to obtain competitive 
advantages, should no longer be possible. 
As a consequence of this reform, the DoE declassified large quantities of technical in-
formation on nuclear warheads. Since this information was known already anyway, the 
DoE could see – in compliance with the new criteria – no danger of proliferation, but 
rather it made pure research easier. Even the danger that an opponent might get a clearer 
picture of the state of the art of American nuclear equipment, no longer appeared to ex-
ist.148 Another, very notable consequence of the openness initiative is the publication of 
data on the American production and use of plutonium from 1944 to 1994.149 It can be 
seen as an important preliminary stage to internationally agreed transparency measures 
regarding weapon-grade material – a requirement raised time and again in the discussions 
on cutoff (cf. Section 3.3.2). 
Conservative circles, especially Congress with its conservative majority, watched the ef-
forts for transparency with increasing suspicion. On several occasions, Congress politi-
cians accused the administration and especially the then Energy Minister O’Leary of be-
traying secrets and damaging US national security. Towards the end of Clinton’s term in 
office, the efforts lost their impetus. One indicator is the scandal over alleged attempts at 
espionage by the Chinese at the nuclear weapons laboratory in Los Alamos. A report from 
Congresses on these accusations, the so-called ”Cox Report” 150, resulted in a wave of new 
restrictions and calls for more secrecy and less international cooperation, although a 
number of experts criticised the report on account of many serious and obvious errors. 
Among these critics were highly-respected and influential government advisors, including 
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Wolfgang Panofsky and Richard Garwin.151 Startled by the general hysteria, even the po-
litically conservative scientists at the nuclear weapon laboratories called for common 
sense to prevail since they could see and feared that their international cooperation would 
be jeopardised, that foreign colleagues on site would loose their basis for work. 
3.3.5 Non-proliferation policy 
The new emphasis on ”counterproliferation” did not lead to a complete devaluation of 
conventional nuclear non-proliferation policy. In fact, it was pursued very energetically 
on two levels:  
· against the main ”problem children” – North Korea, Iran and Iraq 
· in the preparation for and assessment of the Extension Conference for the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
Dealing with ”problem states” 
The most serious problem with which the Clinton government had to deal with was un-
questionably the crisis over the North Korean nuclear weapons programme. In 1991/2, 
North Korea gave false details to the IAEA to disguise the fact that it had processed more 
plutonium than the government was prepared to admit. When the IAEA discovered this 
breach of the NPT, matters came to a dangerous head: North Korea declared her with-
drawal from the NPT, the United States looked into the military options of destroying the 
nuclear capacity of the communist country, and the Security Council investigated the idea 
of threatening sanctions as a way of applying pressure, but due to China’s refusal, it was 
not in a position to carry this out. In this situation, the Clinton administration resorted to 
bilateral diplomacy outside the framework of the regime, which in spring 1994 became an 
easier option thanks to the voluntary trip by the former President Carter to Pyongyang. 
The talks resulted in the conclusion of a ”framework understanding”, according to which 
North Korea would receive two nuclear power reactors and in a countermove would end 
its domestic nuclear programme and – gradually – permit the IAEA access to all nuclear 
facilities, including those which hitherto had remained closed to the agency. In any case, 
this crucial step would only become possible once essential components for the reactors 
had been delivered. That was how the North Korean Agreement came into being, initially 
in formal breach of the NPT. The serious crisis had been averted and the perspective cre-
ated that the breach against the NPT would be cured within a decade. 
152
 In a similar dila-
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tory way, the Clinton administration later resolved the conflict over the development of 
North Korean long-range missiles – North Korea agreed to a moratorium, the USA eased 
economic sanctions.
153
 
Clinton proceeded quite differently with Iran. In this case, there had been rumours for 
years that the Mullah country was running a secret nuclear weapon programme that was 
not under the supervisory watch of the International Atomic Energy Agency, but was 
being monitored by Revolution Watch and the Secret Service. The dialogue mainly con-
cerned attempts at purchasing centrifuge enrichment technology. However, there was no 
conclusive proof. The Clinton administration continued the strict technology blockade 
against Iran and tried with enormous effort to persuade its own allies, Russia and China to 
follow suit. Proposals, to finish the half-finished Busheer nuclear power station with 
Western engineering and , in return, to demand from Iran extended commitments – 
more transparency, the discontinuation of enrichment and reprocessing, the removal of 
spent fuel – which went beyond the NPT and also the agreement with North Korea, were 
rejected by the USA. The USA pursued a long, and eventually fruitless dispute with Russia 
as to whether Moscow should give up nuclear cooperation with Iran altogether. In any 
case, she did manage to stop the burgeoning transfer of Russian enrichment technology. 
She did not seriously pursue dialogue with Iran. She justified the unequal treatment be-
tween Iran and North Korea by saying that North Korea already had what Iran wanted – 
actually an ideal incentive for Iran to try all the harder!
154
 
In Iraq, the Clinton administration had to contend with the continued attempts of the 
Iraqi government to rescue the remains of its weapons of mass destruction programmes 
by deceiving, intimidating and hindering the inspectors. The administration ultimately 
succeeded in the nuclear sector at least; here, after 1995, the IAEA was convinced that it 
had cleared up and, to a large extent, liquidised the programme. The picture was different 
where biological and chemical weapons were concerned. For a long time the Clinton gov-
ernment had looked on at events in Iraq with an amazing amount of indifference. Only 
the no-fly zones in the north and south were maintained, occasionally with the use of 
military might. However, during the work with the counterproliferation initiative, the 
administration, – i.e., long before Bush Junior – came to the conclusion that the problem 
could ultimately only be resolved with a change of regime. In response to gradual provo-
cations from Saddam Hussein, Clinton focused on military containment without enforc-
ing the firm implementation of Security Council resolutions 687 and 715 unilaterally or 
via the United Nations. Military action was selective, the ”regime change” policy was not 
rigorously pursued. When Iraq seriously hindered the inspections in 1998, the USA by-
passed the Security Council in winter 1998 by way of a daring legal interpretation: the 
breach against resolutions 687 and 715, in the view of the USA, placed Iraq back to her 
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status before the armistice and entitled the combatants to renew hostilities. On this basis, 
the USA together with Great Britain carried out the ”Desert Fox” air force operation 
which aimed to set back the military reconstruction of Iraq.
155
 
The extension of the NPT 
The biggest non-proliferation project of the Clinton administration was the indefinite 
extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the duration of which had initially 
been set for 25 years after its commencement (1970). The diplomatic campaign, drawn up 
by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under the control of the deputy leader 
Thomas Graham and covered direct contact between President Clinton and the heads of 
state of especially important key countries – South Africa, Mexico – was conducted with 
much rigour, occasionally also with intense pressure exercised on the likes of Venezuela 
and the Philippines. At the conference itself, US diplomacy proved itself to be skilled and 
flexible. The requirement expressed by South Africa to provide the NPT in future with an 
”expanded inspection process” and to establish consensually a series of specific standards 
(”principles and objectives”), against which fulfilment of the treaty would be measured, 
was accepted by the USA and implemented against cautious parties (e.g. Russia). The 
standards included e.g. the conclusion of a Test Ban Treaty by 1996, further ”systematic” 
reductions in nuclear weapon arsenals and greater transparency in export control policy. 
The American government also finally accepted the demand from the Arabic member 
countries, to address the problem of Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons critically in a 
special resolution on the Middle East. Of course, the US delegation fought hard with each 
formulation. The fact that Washington was at all prepared, however, to tolerate this criti-
cal document goes to show how much store this government set by the multilateral non-
proliferation regime.
156
 
In connection with the indefinite extension of the NPT, the reform of the NPT verifi-
cation system within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency was also 
successfully concluded. This of course demanded concessions from the non-nuclear 
weapon states and only marginally affected the nuclear weapon states. All the same, the 
USA was more prepared to allow certain elements of the new system to be used, on herself 
too, than other nuclear weapon states.
157
 
In the period afterwards, however, the American will, to really subject herself to the 
decisions made in 1995, notably waned. It is true that the Test Ban Treaty was concluded 
in accordance with the programme in 1996, even though three years later, American entry 
was rejected by Senate (cf. Section 3.3.1). During the preparation process for the next 
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Inspection Conference (2000), however, the American delegation behaved as if the deci-
sions of 1995 had never existed: it was the treaty which was to be inspected, according to 
the American position, not the ”principles and objectives”, which, however, had been set 
by the Extension Conference as the very inspection standards! The Middle East resolution 
of 1995 should not constitute an obstacle to inspection in any way. When the Americans 
extended their ”deconstruction policy” against the agreements of 1995 to procedural mat-
ters as well (they refused at first to hear anything about the then intended ”subsidiary 
bodies” for the 2000 conference, i.e., workgroups for individual special matters), a row 
threatened to break out at the Inspection Conference.
158
 Contrary to expectation, it did 
not get so far, because at the conference, the USA was surprisingly, yet very diplomatically 
and compromisingly, persuaded. In a joint declaration from the five nuclear weapon 
states the most controversial problem, the ABM Treaty, was alleviated by a comprise in 
the formulation. During negotiations, the USA showed herself to be even more obliging 
than other nuclear weapon states when it came to elaborating and specifying the ”princi-
ples and objectives” of 1995. The conference ended with a consensus not least due to the 
skill of US diplomats – another indication of how important the NPT was to the USA 
under Clinton: In view of the risks, brought about through the South Asian tests and the 
continued problems with North Korea, Iraq and possibly also Iran, it was preferred not to 
expose the regime to the crisis through open dispute amongst its members.
159 
3.3.6 Discourse on further nuclear disarmament 
The Cold War ended at the start of the 1990’s. Following the conclusion of the two 
START Treaties, nuclear disarmament appeared to be on course. Therefore, an optimism 
grew that the process would continue. In addition to the disarmament of tactical nuclear 
weapons, the indefinite extension of the NPT and the talks on arms control treaties also 
supported this optimism: new nuclear weapon-free zones were negotiated, and more 
states joined the NPT. In the long term, the international community no longer saw full 
nuclear disarmament as pure utopia.
160
 Two international institutions made major contri-
butions to the delegitimisation of nuclear weapons. The first was the Canberra Commis-
sion for Nuclear Disarmament which was set up in autumn 1995 by a Western-oriented 
government, Australia, and which aimed expressly at the complete elimination of all nu-
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clear weapons. It presented its report in January 1997.
161
 The second was the International 
Court of Justice in The Hague, which concerned itself with the legality of nuclear weapons 
and which came to the conclusion on 8 July 1996 that threatening with or using nuclear 
weapons contravened international law in practically all armed conflict.
162
 
Lots of initiatives of this kind were also developed in the USA. They were triggered in 
particular by the indefinite extension of the NPT.
163
 A widely diverse spectrum of non-
government organisations in the form of research institutes, think tanks and grass roots 
organisations acted as innovators for the government’s disarmament policy. In govern-
ment circles, too, the readiness to consider the elimination of all nuclear weapons as a 
possible end goal to the disarmament process grew. Much noted studies on a future nu-
clear order or complete disarmament were presented by the Committee on International 
Security and Arms Control (CISAC) of the National Academy of Sciences, the Henry L. 
Stimson Center and the Atlantic Council. 
CISAC, a traditionally very influential and highly-regarded policy advisory committee, 
published a study on future American nuclear weapon policy in 1997.
164
 Based on the 
Nuclear Posture Review published at the end of 1994 (cf. Section 3.2.), it recommended in 
a first step, far-reaching reductions backed up by political measures as a way of reducing 
the importance of nuclear weapons. In a second step, the attempt should be made to le-
gitimise nuclear weapons, in international law too. This study can be seen as an expres-
sion of a discussion which it typically was in large parts of academic circles. However, by 
the time of publication, the Clinton administration had been weakened to take up pro-
posals in the study.
165
 
The Stimson Center project aimed expressly at the dismantling of weapons of mass de-
struction. In February 1995, it submitted its first report – a kind of stocktaking of the nu-
clear arms control process and disarmament process.
166
 In it, it called for a national 
American, but also international debate on the long-term goals of disarmament. Due to a 
lack of long-term perspective in the Nuclear Posture Review published under the Clinton 
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administration, the second publication of the Stimson project addressed precisely this 
matter.
167
 In it, the authors proposed an ”evolutionary” approach to a phased reduction of 
the US nuclear weapon arsenal. In any case, at the beginning of such a process, the US 
government was to commit itself to the objective of worldwide elimination of all weapons 
of mass destruction. 
Publications conducted by the Atlantic Council, Further Reins on Nuclear Arms Project, 
argued along a similar vein.
168
 It recommended, as a next step beyond the maximum limit 
of strategic nuclear weapons agreed in START II, agreeing to a top limit of 1,500 to 2,000 
deployed warheads bilaterally between the USA and Russia. Next, the arsenals of all nu-
clear weapons states should be reduced to 100-200 warheads. This reduction would be 
supplemented by supporting measures, such as No-First-Use declarations by nuclear 
weapon states or increased non-proliferation efforts. Under certain conditions – addi-
tional nuclear weapon-free zones, prior conclusion of a CTBT and cut-off treaty and a 
ban on all land-based ballistic missiles – complete nuclear disarmament could be sought 
by a non-specified date. 
Together, these three projects constituted an attempt to set the reduction of nuclear 
weapons comfortably alongside future US nuclear strategy. It was precisely this link that 
was the weak point in the Clinton administration’s security policy. The formulation of the 
US Nuclear Posture appeared to have shown little consideration of the consequences for 
the non-proliferation and disarmament goals of American security policy (cf. Section 3.2).  
3.4 Summary 
The ambivalence of nuclear policy was maintained during the Clinton administration, in 
fact, it intensified somewhat. The Nuclear Posture Review continued the conservative 
planning and strategy-making and safeguarded the continuity of the nuclear forces in 
structure and doctrine. The counterproliferation initiative accelerated the dynamic ele-
ment of a new perception of threat, which also had consequences for nuclear strategy and 
began to orchestrate non-proliferation policy militarily. This trend had already peaked in 
Iraq under Clinton. It is typical that the doubt in the ability of the ”major” opponents 
(Russia, China) to develop democratically and the maniacal difference between the de-
mocratic nature and the totalitarian character of the ”rogue states” provided the essential 
ideological justification for the strongline positions in the strategic debate. These positions 
in the administration were most likely to be found in the Pentagon, otherwise among the 
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Republicans in Congress and in the opposition’s security establishment. Arms control and 
disarmament push at the limits of this debate; in the Test Ban Treaty they were exceeded, 
but its ratification failed in the Senate, however. All other arms control and disarmament 
initiatives got into difficulty, too. The exception was the truly revolutionary CTR, in 
which past (and – in the long term, many – future) enemies were assisted in disarmament. 
Finally, the administration proved itself to be more or less capable of handling the NPT 
multilateral instrument virtuously and successfully.  
The move away from active multilateralism in arms control policy took place under 
pressure from Congress, where in both houses, the Republican right dominated, and par-
ticularly in the Senate from the chairmen of the two most important committees (foreign 
and defence). Public interest in foreign affairs also receded further during the second 
Clinton administration. In 1999, relations with other countries caught the attention of 
only 45% of Americans, a further slip of 5% since 1994. Foreign policy problems were 
only rated among the country’s important problems by 7.3% (a fall of 4.2%). Among the 
external problems, arms control was rated as among the three most important issues by 
only 7%; in addition to terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was 
seen as an extremely important danger; but the majority of Americans clearly did not link 
this danger – despite an undiminished preference for multilateralism – with multilateral 
arms control agreements as a solution.169 Such opinions gave the executive and legislative a 
broad scope for action, but considerably weakened the chances of the arms control lobby 
lending weight to their demands with broad public support. 
4. The Nuclear Policy of the Bush Jr Administration 
4.1 Foreign policy and security policy guidelines 
Bush Junior entered office with a team that was more unilateral and more inclined to-
wards uncompromising American military superiority than any US government before. 
However, it should be born in mind that the team’s entry to office concluded the devel-
opment of the 1990’s quite consistently, since the decade had moved increasingly towards 
these two policy components – unilateralism and supremacy. What particularly character-
ised the Bush administration was a blunt, often coarse rhetoric and unambiguous behav-
iour,
170
 which no longer left room for misunderstandings or interpretation (especially on 
the part of well-meaning allies), only submissiveness, opposition or resignation. 
The unilateralism aspect became apparent in the fact that the administration failed to 
enter into a series of agreements already concluded or at least satisfactorily negotiated 
(Kyoto Protocol), or withdrew its signature (International Criminal Court), or an-
nounced its opposition (Biological Diversity Protocol, Test Ban Treaty, maritime law, 
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Protocol to the AntiTorture Convention), boycotted or sabotaged current negotiations 
(Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Bioweapons Protocol) or 
withdrew from treaties (ABM Treaty). International law became the instrument of Ameri-
can power politics, which was either supported or rejected by the government based on 
pure opportunity. The fact that the gradual strengthening of the international system of 
laws represented a world order principle that in itself reflected a primary interest in de-
mocratic foreign policy, was refuted by the Bush government; it therefore unilaterally 
terminated a consensus among Western democracies that had existed since the Second 
World War. The following, constant quarrelling with the majority of the allied partners, 
namely France and Germany, grew from this unprecedented act of America policy, which 
unilaterally destroyed the 50-year-old basis of the alliance, but which did not stop Wash-
ington from taking offence to the differing positions of the allies. The trend was already 
visible before September 11th.
171
 After a brief ”pseudo multilateral” spell following the 
terror attacks, unilateralism, the prioritising of military instrumentation and indifference 
to international law returned with clearly greater force under the banner of ”War against 
Terrorism”. 
Bush, therefore, consistently followed the ”blueprint” of neoconservative foreign pol-
icy strategies, which, already at the start of the nineties, had promoted American superior-
ity – the ”unipolar factor” – not to be used as an instrument of multilateral world order 
policy, as Bush Senior had ultimately done, but to understand it as a principle of world 
order: American interests and the interests of the other (well-meaning) states were one 
and the same. The unilateral exercising of American power was therefore the best way to 
keep stability and order in the world.
172
 Just like every other ideological claim to suprem-
acy, this, too, was clothed in the mantle of historical necessity: the superiority of American 
power in particular left Washington no choice, for world order policy reasons, but to pur-
sue the self-elected strategy undeterred.
173
 
The cracks in this strategy were obvious in just the first few months of the Bush gov-
ernment. The refusal of arms control and the organised withdrawal from multilateralism 
had already led to major complaints, among the allies, too, before September 11th. The 
attacks on New York and Washington simply gave impetus to pursue the already chosen 
path more vigorously and with clearer priority for the instrument of the USA’s own mili-
tary strength. Multilateral alibis such as re-entry into UNESCO and the settlement of 
debts with the United Nations – as welcome as these gestures are – do not blind us to the 
fact of the fundamental unilateralism and nationalism of the American position. It is a 
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strategy which gives only the minimum amount of room for arms control, disarmament 
and non-proliferation, especially in multilateral form, if at all. Any restriction to Amer-
ica’s freedom of action is forcibly excluded. Since multilateral agreements are based on 
reciprocality, and in security policy, too, to a certain extent, they hardly play a positive 
role in the Bush administration apparatus.
174
 
This world policy thinking has found its clearest expression in the ”National Security 
Strategy” published in summer 2002.
175
 The document puts in systematic, detailed form 
what the president himself declared in his much-quoted speech in June 2002 At the Mili-
tary Academy in West Point:
176
 The threat to the United States is both immense and dif-
fuse. Immense, because the possibility of weapons of mass destruction being used against 
American soil has become a real danger. Diffuse, because the enemy himself cannot be 
attacked: the enemy is an assumed, supposed or forecast alliance of purpose between 
”rogue states”, megaterrorists and those who have made available operational weapons of 
mass destruction to these people. Deterrence and defence against this constellation are, of 
course, useful (hence the preservation of the missile defence), yet not enough. The lack of 
information from this enemy constellation forces us to keep on a high offensive. The size 
of the danger constitutes a risk via multilateral, forensic debate and demands pre-
emption, as soon as the indicators of danger increase. Finally, prevention is also required 
where unstable or hostile regimes are making attempts to obtain weapons of mass de-
struction. Since the alliance of purpose with terrorism for such regimes cannot be pre-
cluded just as much as the surprisingly fast success of their attempts at proliferation (for 
example through the transfer of technology from outside), intervention is required as 
soon as the first signs of such weapons programmes show.
177
 The United States, therefore, 
claim that they have the right born out of the need to defend to intervene in any place on 
earth where this constellation of danger is forming, simply based on a national decision 
and without the detour of an international mandate. Her military planning, doctrine and 
equipment must be established accordingly. 
Here, as in so many other matters, September 11th simply led to clearer profiling of a 
policy laid down long before this date and way before the Bush administration came into 
office. In the Clinton years, the removal of the controlling regime plus the containment of 
its military ability was already forming a parallel goal which made America’s Iraq policy 
ambivalent and unclear: declaratorial policy had stressed the containment, it could be 
clearly seen from many comments that the wish was to effect a regime change using sanc-
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tions and military means alongside.
178
 The right wing of the Republicans represented by a 
number of prominent officials in the current government (including Cheney, Libby, 
Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Khalilzad and Bolton) had, in 1998, already pushed for this goal to 
be reached through a forced change in regime.
179
 The emphasis of this declaratorial policy 
has also logically changed under Bush: the ”regime change” now enjoys priority, and con-
tainment is being achieved alongside using the focussed means. At the same time, the 
construction of the ”axis of evil” has found expression such that the USA has reserved the 
transfer of this double objective to other objects.
180
 
Consequently, this objective goes hand in hand with a doctrine of absolute superiority. 
The USA wishes – in thorough realisation of the 1992 Wolfowitz paper still modestly sup-
pressed (see above) – to maintain such a large military power differential to all other pow-
ers that to attempt to compete in military terms appears pointless from the start.
181
 Since, 
it the USA claims a right to global intervention, the strategic interests of others are inevi-
tably affected. In order for these others to remain silent and not cause any damage, Amer-
ica must be imposingly superior. This inevitable superiority applies especially to China, 
already rated as a potential rival by the Republican government (if not treated right out as 
an enemy, see the consent to WTO entry). Of course, this strategy is alleviated by the 
strong convergence between the USA and Putin’s Russia. 
Interestingly, American nuclear weapons do not feature in the ”National Security 
Strategy” (in contrast to those of rogue states). This, however, in no way means that they 
have played out their role in the strategic arsenal of the USA. Based on the National Secu-
rity Strategy, they are, first of all, part of the absolute superiority, to which a nuclear arse-
nal belongs; this explains the preservation of an immense ability to build up the strategic 
forces of the USA even after the planned reductions (see below). Secondly, in extreme 
cases, they can also become weapons of pre-emption, where the destruction of weapons of 
mass destruction and their production facilities or a direct attack on the command bun-
kers of ”rogue states”, perhaps also on conventionally unreachable hiding places of terror-
ist leaders, are concerned.
182
 You can only read between the lines of the National Security 
Strategy where these functions are concerned. An earlier document, the new Nuclear Pos-
ture Review, was more explicit. 
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4.2 Nuclear strategy: the new Nuclear Posture Review 
After the Bush administration had been in office barely a year, the DoD submitted a new 
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to Congress on 31 January 2001, which Defence Minister 
Rumsfeld had commissioned a few months earlier.
183
 It concerned an analysis of future 
defence plans for the next five to ten years, which had been worked out in close coopera-
tion with the DoE. On 9 January, the DoD held a press conference to present a summary 
of the most important points. The entire text, however, was kept classified. On 9 March 
2002, however, the Los Angeles Times and New York Times managed to get hold of the 
entire text. Shortly thereafter, significant extracts appeared on the Internet.183 It gave rise 
to fears that the Bush administration could develop new nuclear weapons.
184
  
If you compare the new NPR with that of the previous government (Section 3.2), you 
can see continuities, but also significant differences:185 continuities result from the fact that 
the Bush administration, too, like both previous governments, recognised the need to 
adapt the size of the nuclear arsenal at the end of the Cold War. To start with, it means 
that the NPR ”leaves behind the Cold War practices of nuclear planning.” Nevertheless, it 
recommended leaving around 2,000 strategic warheads deployed, or more precisely, 3,800 
by 2007 and 1,700 – 2,200 by 2012. In addition to that, several thousand warheads were to 
be kept in reserve, so that they could be quickly put back into service and also used. The 
”Peacekeeper” intercontinental ballistic missiles which can carry 10 warheads and their 
silos were mothballed, not destroyed.186 The only justification for such an enormous arse-
nal is, as before, as deterrence to Russia. But this justification barely differs from Clinton’s 
policy of that of Bush Senior. The uncertainty over future Russian foreign policy also mo-
tivated previous governments to maintain a massive arsenal in reserve. The figures corre-
spond in essence to the plans of the Clinton government for a possible START III Treaty, 
which it announced in 1997 at the Helsinki Summit (cf. Section 3.3.4). But, there was 
another important step backwards behind Clinton’s policy: the review also sought for 
more transparency and irreversibility, e.g. by also wanting to include verification of the 
destruction of warheads. Instead, the NPR missed out the destruction of the warheads. So, 
this part is also missing from the treaty (”SORT”) which Bush and Putin concluded at 
their summit in May 2002. According to unofficial sources, the USA possesses around 
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5,000 intact reserve warheads, plus the components for an additional 12,000 warheads 
which can be quickly rebuilt.187 The NPR also missed out the disarmament of tactical nu-
clear weapons, instead it noted that such ”non-strategic weapons” were contained in the 
US nuclear arsenal. The figure for these tactical nuclear weapons is around 1,100, of which 
150 are still deployed in Europe, including Germany. Russia still has more than 3,600 
tactical nuclear weapons deployed.188 
In the second half of the 1990’s, the cry for an extension in the warning times had in-
creased, in order to mitigate the risk of an accidental nuclear war.189 The NPR called for 
precisely the opposite: the warning times should be shortened and rapid rearmament pos-
sible. The objective was more reversibility of the disarmament process. The risk of an acci-
dental nuclear war should be met with the expansion of the missile defence. Even the re-
serve warheads should remain on alert, so that they can be used practically immediately. 
Russia found herself on the list of possible target countries still, together with North 
Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya and China. This list, too, matches that planned by the pre-
vious government, which had also provided for the potential pre-emptive use of nuclear 
weapons against ”proliferators”. Possible scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons were 
not expressly extended: their aim was no longer to deter, but also to respond to a ”whole 
range of threats”, including attacks with conventional, chemical or biological weapons, 
and ”surprising military developments”.190 
In addition to that, the NPR supported more flexible military planning, which would 
move away from so-called threat-oriented defence to capacity-oriented defence. In this 
way, the USA should be able to adapt more quickly to new realities. Traditionally, Ameri-
can strategic weapons are organised in a triad, deployed with land, sea and air-based 
troops. The new NPR stresses that nuclear weapons will continue to play a central role in 
warfare. It outlined a new triad, the first components of which would come from the for-
mer nuclear defence together with improved conventional armament. The second com-
ponent would cover active and passive defence with a fundamental role for missile de-
fence, and finally the third component would contain the development of a defence infra-
structure which could react quickly to changes in the security situation. Altogether, how-
ever, it concerned concepts which had already been contemplated during the previous 
administrations. 
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The new NPR also discussed the need for new weapon systems, especially designed to 
strike silos and bunkers in which weapons of mass destruction could be deployed. For 
this, the DoD and DoE have been studying nuclear and conventional systems. Critics fear 
that this could lead to new nuclear tests. These plans, too, are not new and reflect the 
plans of the previous governments, which – without nuclear tests – led to the develop-
ment of B-61-11 earth penetrating warheads during the 1990’s (cf. Section 3.3.1). Its 
chances of really striking underground bunkers are, however, limited, in addition to 
which, that kind of use would produce enormous fallout.191 The capabilities of conven-
tional weapons are even more limited. Weapons specialists have, therefore, proposed de-
veloping a completely new warhead in clear contrast to the announcement by the Clinton 
administration to do away with them in the future. The radioactive fallout should be 
minimised and the warhead should be hardened to produce deeper penetration.192 Other 
experts argued that the fallout would also be unacceptably high and the level of hardening 
required was in principle not possible.193 
Based on the development of new warhead types, production capacities should also be 
expanded. It said in the NPR: ”for the long term a new modern production facility will be 
needed to deal with the large-scale replacement of components and new production.” The 
Stockpile Stewardship continued to be regarded as an important project of the highest 
national interest (cf. Section 3.3.1). 
These elements of the NPR show that, for the Bush II administration, nuclear weapons 
are more important than less important, that the government wishes to see new roles for 
nuclear weapons and more flexibility, and that it would like to perpetuate this importance 
through the expansion of the research and development facilities. 
The new NPR differs alarmingly from the Clinton administration’s review in one im-
portant aspect: it rejects arms control in order to achieve maximum flexibility in its ac-
tions. Whereas the Clinton administration tried to enter the ABM Treaty, the Bush gov-
ernment terminated it to gain itself a free hand in the development of missile defence. The 
previous administration also supported the ratification and the commencement of the 
CTBT, the new administration has no intention of troubling itself with ratification. The 
NPR also proposes recompiling teams for ”advanced warhead designs” and shortening the 
time for the preparation of new nuclear tests from 2-3 years to less than a year. 
The NPR – at least in the published extracts – mentions not a word about the NPT, let 
alone the commitment in the treaty to take up talks with the aim of a nuclear weapon-free 
world. Instead, the NPR expressly supports including some non-nuclear weapon states on 
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the list of target countries. This contradicts the earlier declarations of nuclear weapon 
states not to do this as an incentive for other countries to give up nuclear weapons. 
The NPR was controversially discussed in public. Practically all activist groups and 
think tanks concerned with nuclear disarmament published critical views;194 but found 
very little public resonance. Both opponents to and supporters of the policy described in 
the NPR criticised its secrecy. Since it was a political document and not a plan for specific 
action, it must be published.195  
In the Defense Planning Guidance, the Pentagon’s official planning document, the bun-
ker-penetrating nuclear weapons were then added to the pre-emptive strategy a few 
months later: such weapons must be developed otherwise the pre-emptive strategy would 
be missing a vital instrument.196 
4.3 Nuclear arms control policy 
4.3.1  Strategic nuclear weapons: the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) 
At the Washington Summit in November 2001, Bush announced the reductions in the 
American nuclear weapon arsenal. Putin, who, November 2000, had proposed reductions 
down to 1,500 warheads each side, responded immediately with an identical announce-
ment. He insisted on confirming these reductions in a formal and binding document. 
Bush hesitated at first: in his announcement on reductions he said, ”the endless hours of 
discussion”, which would have ultimately led to the START Treaties, were no longer nec-
essary, for the USA and Russia had ”a relationship built on trust”.197 Yet, in a later speech 
at the Russian Embassy, he conceded to Putin that a treaty would also be concluded. This 
also had the purpose of calming the indignation at the simultaneously announced with-
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drawal from the ABM Treaty. Later, security advisor Rice announced that a treaty could 
also ”perhaps contain ... verification procedures from other treaties”. It was not, however 
an arms control treaty.198 Democratic senators criticised this hesitation. A treaty would not 
only clarify matters, it would also pay due respect to the Senate that had to ratify it.197 
On 24 May 2002, Bush and Putin signed an agreement to cut their arsenals according 
to the announcements and to work together in the fight against terrorism.199 The treaty 
comprises only 475 words. It is a treaty bound by international law which commits both 
sides to reduce their deployed strategic systems to 1,700 – 2,200 by December 2012. It 
contains, however, no conditions at all over what will happen with the carrier systems or 
warheads. Both sides can determine the composition of their arsenals themselves. A bilat-
eral ”Treaty Committee” will meet twice a year until the treaty expires in 2012. The obli-
gations will then be extinguished. On top of that, it set out no transparency or verification 
measures. A great deal of flexibility is thus afforded to both sides in their performance of 
the treaty. 
None of the documents made public at the meeting mention the START II Treaty. 
This meant that Russia no longer felt bound to this treaty. When, on 13 June 2002, the 
USA left the ABM Treaty, the Russian Foreign Ministry made a corresponding declara-
tion. With the exit from the ABM Treaty and the failed American ratification of START 
II, all the criteria by which Russia might still feel bound to the treaty fell away.200 As a re-
sult, Russia can modernise her SS-18s, each equipped with 10 warheads and maintain 
them at alert status. Their service life could be extended from 2008 to 2015. Under START 
II, these systems would have had to be scrapped (cf. Section 2.3.1). 
Putin made it clear that there were important differences of opinion over the treaty: 
Whereas Bush wanted to keep ”disarmed” nuclear weapons in reserve, Putin saw the need 
to eliminate some parts of the arsenal altogether. Whereas the Americans would have the 
opportunity to rearm quickly with such a reserve, the disarmament process on the Rus-
sian side is scarcely reversible. Therefore, from the start, the Russians wanted to include 
possible American rearmament on the agenda. They proposed two solutions: the verified 
destruction of warheads or the destruction of carrier systems themselves. Both would have 
made rearmament difficult. Whereas the first option has been part of discussions since the 
Helsinki Summit in 1997, the Russians only mentioned the second one shortly before the 
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end of the talks.201 The Americans. however are insisting on the option of storing the war-
heads intact, so that they can be rearmed quickly if necessary – an option already an-
nounced in the NPR, too – which caused mistrust among the Russians and undermined 
the treaty.202 
All the same, both sides agreed to negotiate further over transparency and verification. 
Since both these elements have been left out, the treaty has become so short it looks more 
like the beginnings of long talks. Although the Russians consider the irreversibility of the 
reductions very important, they failed to offer any specific and feasible proposals – the 
time before signature was too short to prepare any, and the subject of transparency was 
also too controversially discussed in Russia. Verification of the destruction of warheads 
impacts on highly sensitive information about the warheads, and although there have 
been successful bilateral workgroups engaged on this subject for some years now, they are 
still working on a more technical level.203 The results are not yet ready to be converted into 
policy, and even less so since the current mood in the USA and in Russia does not encour-
age an increase in transparency (cf. Section 3.3.4). 
4.3.2 CTR 
Although some CTR programmes are established in treaties – mostly at the ministerial 
level – there are lots of activities which have no formal safeguard at all. This makes their 
financing prone to crisis. On the other hand, they are less dependent on current US-
Russian political relations.204 Clinton’s policy of openness contributed not least in this 
respect, since it allowed for cooperation on the technical level without heavy bureaucratic 
influence (cf. Section 3.3.3). During his election campaign, Bush had announced the con-
tinuation of the CTR programme. He also promised to apply to Congress for more funds 
to aid the destruction of Russian warheads. On the other hand, he had criticised the active 
collaboration of the Clinton administration with Russia because of the divulgence of too 
much sensitive information. 
On taking up office, a number of misgivings were given much more emphasis:205 the 
Russian cooperation with Iran over the building of the Busheer light water reactors, espe-
cially, caused the government to consider cutting the financing of the CTR. For this rea-
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son, in 2000, Congress refused funds for certain projects.206 In 2001, it cut back on a whole 
series of individual projects. The proposed budget for 2002 came in at more than 30% less 
than the previous year’s budget.207 
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, this policy was changed again. 
Bush called the CTR initiatives ”our top priority”.208 An analysis of the State Department, 
which examined around 30 projects came to the conclusion that ”the majority of CTR 
programmes work well, are well managed and concentrate on the essential priorities.”209 
The disposal of nuclear weapon-grade material and the improvement in the transparency 
and inventorising of Russian warheads, among other things, should be promoted in par-
ticular. Earlier versions of this report ought, however, to have been very critical and rec-
ommended far-reaching cuts.210 In fact, past cuts were reversed. The proposed budget for 
2003 comprised around 1 billion US dollars. This sum, therefore, corresponded roughly 
to the amount Clinton had proposed for 2001, but did not go beyond which was hailed by 
many critics as being too half-hearted.211 The project aimed at transparency for Russian 
warheads suffered moreover from the refusal of the USA to permit reciprocal measures 
and her wish to keep her warheads in reserve rather than scrap them (cf. Section 4.3.1) 
4.3.3 Cutoff and the Test Ban Treaty 
In its scepticism of arms control, the Bush administration has no plans of re-submitting 
the CTBT to the Senate. Opinion in the administration is split between those who reject 
the treaty and those who believe that ratification would be in the American national inter-
est. Some even support the withdrawal of the US signature from the bottom of the treaty 
text. The administration hasn’t gone that far yet. But, it did stay away from the Special 
Conference of member states in November 2002 which aimed to accelerate ratification.212 
The USA likewise voted against a Japanese proposed resolution before the United Na-
tions, which supported an extension of the test moratorium and the early commencement 
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of the CTBT and against a proposal to set the CTBT on the agenda of the UN General 
Assembly.213 
In any case, the Administration was in favour of keeping the test moratorium for the 
time being and the international monitoring system currently being built. It expressed an 
interest in verification since it was seen as extending the national means of detection. 
However, the administration did not intend to provide means for activities which would 
prepare for later on-site inspections. 
The discussion surrounding the CTBT was dominated by three subjects:214 The first 
was the growing demand for the development of a new earth penetration warhead (cf. 
Sections 3.3.1 and 4.2). This would only be possible with new nuclear tests. The admini-
stration wanted to keep the option open at least. So, the test moratorium was continued, 
but not officially extended for an indefinite period. 
The second was the well-known discussion as to whether the Stockpile Stewardship 
was adequate for inspecting the reliability of the arsenal. Critics claimed that without fur-
ther nuclear tests confidence in its working order could not be sustained in the long term. 
On the other hand, CTBT supporters believed that the Stockpile Stewardship was com-
pletely adequate for that purpose.215 
The third and final subject was verification. Advanced nuclear weapon states were ca-
pable of conducting very small nuclear tests which could not be detected but which suf-
ficed for the development of new nuclear weapons – according to the critics. In fact, some 
government members quoted secret service information, according to which Russia was 
in the process of preparing hydronuclear tests on Novaja Semlja.216 Independent observers 
speculated that this story was cooked up to undermine the credibility of the CTBT. For 
the CTBT was verifiable and its future verification together with the national means of the 
USA could also detect these nuclear tests. This discussion is also well-known and does not 
contain any arguments which have not been scrutinised in previous studies. The latest was 
a report under the aegis of the former General John Shalikashvili, which was commis-
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sioned by the Clinton government.217 It came to the conclusion that there were some dis-
advantages to the treaty, but that its advantages far outweighed them.  
There was also no further progress with cutoff after Bush took office (cf. Section 3.3.2). 
The paralysis of the Geneva CD continued with no change in the reasons for this.218 The 
Bush government has apparently made no attempt at all since entering into office to break 
the blockade with new proposals.  
Since 2001, a few delegations have organised seminars and informal discussions out-
side the official structure of the CD.219 Since 2002, the Dutch delegation has also been try-
ing to organise discussions also outside the CD, which could also anticipate talks to a par-
tial extent. The US delegation has not stood in the way of these activities. Various delega-
tions have made their scepticism clear, however: if China is not on board, then at least all 
other nuclear weapon states and India, Pakistan and Israel must participate. Since this is 
highly unlikely, however, there is no need for the USA to take a position with regard to 
discussions or talks outside the CD. 
4.3.4 Non-proliferation and ”defensive pre-emption” 
Just like arms control in general, multilateral non-proliferation policy also slid down the 
list of priorities to a considerable degree. The ”National Strategy to Combat Weapons of 
Mass Destruction” of December 2002 placed counterproliferation in first place, i.e., mili-
tary precautions. Non-proliferation was placed in second place, followed by aftercare. The 
non-proliferation aspects highlighted are CTR and export controls, although multilateral 
regimes do receive a friendly mention and, of course, the USA’s disarmament commit-
ment regulated in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is not mentioned.220  
Nuclear non-proliferation altogether was less directly affected by the downwards gra-
dation of multilateral arms control than biological non-proliferation (it also imposes far 
fewer commitments on the USA). The Americans’ refusal to talk about a transparency 
protocol ended eight years of intensive work by the treaty community to strengthen the 
bioweapons agreement. In the preparation committee for the inspection of the NPT, the 
US delegation did not adopt such a comparably destructive attitude. However, the Penta-
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gon’s nuclear policy made it clear that the administration was not intending to keep to the 
thirteen steps agreed in 2000, by which the nuclear weapon states were to fulfil their 
commitments laid out in Art. VI of the NPT: So, the termination of the ABM Treaty can-
not be agreed with the promise to strengthen the treaty as a ”cornerstone of stability”. The 
USA has also made no move whatsoever to include tactical nuclear weapons in arms con-
trol, but have, instead of negotiating irreversibility, carefully built in the reversibility of 
disarmament into the SORT Treaty, by losing verification have not increased transparency 
but rather decreased it and expanded the role of nuclear weapons within the framework of 
”pre-emptive defence” instead of limiting it. It has therefore become clear that the pro-
gramme decided by the contractual parties in 2000 in Washington is not being seen as 
important or at all binding. 
Vice-president Cheney characterised the low value placed on multilateral non-
proliferation policy when he declared, that these instruments had been useful in the Cold 
War; in the war against terror, they must be seen as meaningless, however, since terror 
organisations such as Al Qaida are neither contractual parties nor do they respect any 
norm.221 That was of course a trivial deduction; however, the fact that the question had 
not even been asked as to how the treaties could be used to make it difficult for terrorists 
to access weapons of mass destruction was symptomatic. 
Nuclear non-proliferation policy is therefore, still continuing. Against Israel, India and 
Pakistan it has as good as been given up, as can be sensed from the lifting of the economic 
sanctions222. In Southern Asia, it is still a matter of ensuring that neither weapons nor fis-
sile material falls into terrorist hands. The American government tried once again in vain 
to convince its new partner Russia to end her nuclear cooperation with Iran, whereby the 
government appears resigned to the possibility of still stopping the manufacture of the 
reactor in Busheer. At the least she wants to stop Russia from entering into any more co-
operation agreements.223 The part pressure, part diplomatic patience exercised on China,224 
eventually succeeded in convincing Beijing in summer 2002 to reform and clearly sharpen 
her export controls on sensitive multipurpose goods.225 
Washington pursued various strategies where the states making up the ”Axis of Evil” 
were concerned. North Korea saw herself exposed to a roller-coaster of convergence, 
harsh criticism and isolation.226 With the visit of diplomat John Kelly to Pyongyang, the 
State Department made an attempt in summer 2002 to take up talks again in which North 
Korea was confronted with American secret service knowledge of new nuclear activities 
and ultimately requested to give in. When Kelly returned with the news that Pyongyang 
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had conceded its nuclear weapons programme, the administration reacted carefully. In-
stead of contemplating military options and issuing threats, a diplomatic campaign was 
coordinated in order to put international pressure on North Korea and for which consent 
could also be obtained from China to exert diplomatic influence on her neighbours.227 
However, the Bush government did not appear ready to grant the security guarantees 
which Pyongyang set out as a pre-condition for giving up her nuclear weapon pro-
gramme. 
With regard to Iran, the instrument of the technology boycott continued to remain at 
the fore. Since, according to the member states of the European Union and Russia, nu-
merous other players assessed the situation in Iran differently to Washington, this policy 
was only moderately successful. Furthermore, Iran openly announced the progress she 
had made with her fuel-cycle technology, which would enable her in the foreseeable fu-
ture to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium. 
Finally, where Iraq was concerned, Washington concentrated on the military option. 
At the beginning of the war campaign, the return of the inspectors to Iraq was no longer 
the primary focus. Now, Washington looked for a change in regime. Vice-president Che-
ney and the Pentagon in particular saw the toppling of Saddam Hussein as the only guar-
antee that Baghdad’s WMD activities would be brought to an end once and for all. The 
fact that Washington prepared to make this step unilaterally to start with and lifted the 
unilateral decision to a maxim proves once again the loss of priority of multilateral arms 
control under the new administration.228 However, the American preparations for war met 
with resistance from the Security Council. The most important ally, Tony Blair, found 
himself forced through public opinion in Great Britain and major resistance within the 
Labour Party to advise his friend George Bush to seek legitimation through a security 
resolution urgently. For a while therefore, Iraq policy got caught up in multilateral policy. 
However, the Bush government also reserved the use of unilateral military action at any 
time; which included the threat to use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances: coun-
terproliferation dominated non-proliferation. 
4.4 Summary 
The Bush government’s nuclear policy was linked to a series of tendencies which had al-
ready started developing since the early 1990’s and which were also clearly visible under 
Clinton. The government intensified these tendencies in such a way and organised them 
into a much more unilateral and offensive military strategy that they constituted a real 
qualitative leap forward. Nuclear deterrence remained a component of American security 
policy, but lost importance compared to defence and offensive pre-emption. This made a 
considerable reduction in the active nuclear weapon stock possible. At the same time, 
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nuclear weapons were given a role in the new global military strategy – which included 
pre-emption and prevention and covered nuclear warfare scenarios for certain military 
tasks. Counterproliferation, under Clinton a concomitant of conflicts which could lead 
American troops into an area in which weapons of mass destruction existed, now became 
a separate mission for the military with a pre-emptive objective.  
The aversion to any limitation on America's freedom of action and the complete lack 
of trust in the purpose of international arms control law demoted arms control and dis-
armament as separate and important elements of American security policy; maximum 
flexibility became part of the superiority doctrine; this also included large-scale stocks of 
nuclear warhead reserves. This explains the notably permissive character of the SORT 
Treaty. Arms control landed on the far side of the track of a highly narrowed non-
proliferation policy. 
This development benefited from a favourable public opinion which after September 
11th, considered foreign policy matters more important than before due to the extreme 
worry over terrorism and weapons of mass destruction the public was prepared to grant 
the government a great deal of trust and the relevant freedom of action. This presents the 
paradoxical situation that the multilateralism of the American public is not broken; in 
individual matters such as the strengthening of the United Nations, the Kyoto Protocol or 
the International Criminal Court, it is closer to public opinion in Europe than the views 
of its own government. This also applies to matters of arms control: thus, an overwhelm-
ing majority supported the Test Ban Treaty (81%) and the Ottawa Convention against 
Anti-Personnel Mines (75%). The ”war against terrorism” only overshadowed these indi-
vidual matters such that clear opposition to the foreign policy of the Bush government 
cannot emerge.229 
5. Conclusions 
5.1 The trend of American nuclear policy 
The euphoric mood of the early 1990’s in which even hopes of a nuclear-free world ger-
minated, has long gone. After the end of the East-West conflict – after a short spell of 
hesitation – there was a whole string of successes at first: the USA and the Soviet Union, 
or Russia, negotiated START I and START II, the first really substantial disarmament 
treaties, and they reduced their tactical nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty was extended indefinitely, the number of members rose. This success can be un-
derstood as the delegitimisation of nuclear weapons. It underlines the importance of in-
ternational cooperation in non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Another success 
were the negotiations and signing of the CTBT, which would not have been possible with-
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out American commitment. This euphoric mood began during the Bush I administration 
and continued through the first half of the Clinton administration. 
This phase of commitment to nuclear disarmament was accompanied by a renaissance 
of multilateralism.230 President Bush I announced a new world order and his successor, 
President Clinton, started a programme that even had the description assertive multilater-
alism in the title. 
In parallel to the disarmament successes and multilateral renaissance, an opposite 
trend emerged. The inertia of nuclear bureaucracy prevented revolutionary changes in the 
structure and doctrine of the American nuclear forces. The question as to why this still 
immense destructive force – despite the drop in types of weapons – was needed with con-
siderable flexibility was answered by the security establishment with the ever clearer refer-
ence to the ”rogue states”. A new security paradigm emerged that stood more and more in 
the way of radical nuclear disarmament and, towards the end of the decade, contributed 
to the rejection of multilateralism.  
Multilateral orientation failed in the second half of the 1990’s due to the resistance of 
the conservative wing of the Republicans who oriented themselves more and more to this 
new security paradigm. From 1996, they blocked practically all further international trea-
ties, such as the CTBT, the Kyoto Protocol, the Bioweapons Convention, and a Conven-
tion to outlaw Anti-Personnel Mines. The fall of nuclear disarmament took place in paral-
lel. The CTBT will not come into effect without American ratification, further treaty plans 
– such as cutoff – have been put on hold, the USA is pulling out of the ABM Treaty, 
START II is not being ratified and has lost its effect, and its replacement, the ”SORT” 
agreement, looks more like a piece of codified unilateralism, not a cooperative arms con-
trol treaty. All elements, which could realise irreversibility and transparency as still an-
nounced by Clinton and Yeltsin at their Helsinki Summit in 1997 had gone. Even Clin-
ton’s secret efforts for more transparency of the nuclear complex, which were already 
reaching the international stage, were blocked and partially withdrawn. 
The influence of the new security paradigm grew and the importance of multilateral-
ism fell in the second Clinton administration so clearly that the arrival of Bush in office 
ended all ambiguity and misunderstanding: Bush’s Nuclear Posture Review in January 
2001 expressed what had been indicated earlier: nuclear arms control and the strengthen-
ing of the international regime were no longer seen as a security policy instrument. In-
stead, the USA is focussing on her own strength and striving towards maximum freedom 
of action, also at the cost of international cooperation. Multinational rules only hinder 
actions and should be dismantled as far as possible. 
After September 11th 2002, it appeared for a spell that the USA would return to a multi-
lateral orientation. She settled her overdue contributions with the UN and expressed after 
a long time respect for this international organisation. Moreover, she called for an inter-
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national fight against terrorism and pushed NATO, a traditionally international organisa-
tion, into action. This re-orientation to an international global order was only temporary, 
however. The talk of ”the Axis of Evil” was directed exclusively at the American public. In 
the case of Iraq, the Bush administration was determined to ensure a regime change there.  
5.2 The ideals of enlightenment and realistic nuclear strategy  
If you measure this equilibrium of suppositions developed at the start of this paper against 
the priority of nuclear deterrence and arms control in a democratic security policy charac-
terised by a fundamental peaceful nature, the marked differences cannot be missed. The 
role of nuclear weapons as a means to avoid war, i.e., as deterrence, stands quite unambi-
guously to the fore of nuclear policy. It becomes clear that the normative tension between 
the high-quality purpose of keeping the peace and the dubious means of threatening nu-
clear genocide, is bridged by the characterisation of the enemy as totalitarian, dictatorial, 
aggressive, inhuman and unaccountable. Threatening with evil is justified by the equally 
evil character of the enemy opposite. The controlling democracy is confronted with her 
absolute opposite and is to this extent entitled or compelled to consider also means which 
stand in contrast to her own value system. 
Admittedly, there is a clear difference in the new role of nuclear weapons as pre-
empting, fighting and retaliating in regional conflicts with ”rogue states” who possess 
weapons of mass destruction or who wish to acquire some. The earlier anomaly, which 
already existed in the enormous role of nuclear weapons in warfare as ”flexible response” 
and the strategy for victory applicable since the Reagan years in drawn-out nuclear war, 
was transposed to a new area at the moment when it was given up in its old area of use. 
This role is scarcely compatible with the democratic world order which has such high 
regard for the lives of the opposing civil population and contradicts the expectations dis-
cussed at the beginning. 
At first glance, the development of nuclear arms control corresponded to these expec-
tations. Since the end of the East-West conflict, the number of American nuclear weapons 
has steadily decreased. The USA and Russia concluded three important agreements and 
reduced their tactical nuclear weapons through mutual, unilateral, public promises. 
America, however, kept the structure of her arsenal and therefore also her extraordinary 
flexibility. Her readiness for action was not however drastically decreased as it might have 
been; risks were therefore accepted which contradicted the implied unwillingness of de-
mocracies to take risks. The noticeable inclination since 1994 to maintain an ability to re-
arm, i.e., a reversibility of the targeted disarmament, causes disparity with the implied 
tendency to aim for the achievable minimum of a still guaranteed, existential, principally 
defensive ability to deter. The fact that the structure of the nuclear arsenal (triad plus tac-
tical nuclear weapons) has remained the same throughout, contradicts the initially ex-
pressed expectation that the drastic change in international power relations would find 
expression in the American nuclear weapon arsenal on a quantitative and structural level. 
This applies even more to the switch from multilateralism to unilateralism, from the 
exchange of interests, stability and equilibrium to absolute superiority and attack options 
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and from multilateral diplomacy to military pre-emption. The is how the security concept 
of the Bush administration, as currently presented, quite conspicuously contradicts the 
democracy-adequate model developed initially, essential elements of which could be 
found in the strategies of Bush Senior and Clinton, but which could be seen to lose im-
portance during the 1990’s. 
5.3 The causes of the development 
Two factors appear to be crucial to these deviations and the tendency overall: 
Firstly, an enormous inertia has become apparent throughout the concept of thinking, 
threat analyses, dispensings and associated military structures in the nuclear sector devel-
oped in the East-West conflict. The addressees of these concepts were of course trans-
posed from strategic competition with the Soviet Union to the reinsurance against Russia, 
the anticipatory insurance against China and/or the stemming of rogue states and the 
fight against their supposed terrorist allies. Despite this enormous swing in strategic rea-
sons, the preferred remedies remained the same. This operation which pushed logic to its 
limits was facilitated by the obviously enormously strong position of the security policy 
elite and their bureaucratic elements in the American decision-making process. 
This strength appears to be based on three pillars: 
· The basic views voiced by public opinion clearly differ from the concepts of this 
elite, the public does not take foreign and security policy seriously enough, how-
ever, or are not interested enough in it for it to become a central criterion when 
making voting choices. This trend increased in the 1990’s. The elite is therefore 
given considerable freedom of action to put its own preferences into practice.  
· A security concept based exclusively on American strength finds a very positive re-
sponse in the purely conservative to extreme circles, controlled at present by the 
Republican party. Here, the self-portrait of American exceptionalism, of the spe-
cial moral position of the USA, is characterised with particular emphasis. Owing to 
the relationships of power at the end of the East-West conflict, this self-portrait 
could unfold at the political level unhindered: the contrast between the USA and 
the world reveals not only a dangerously strong accentuation of images of all anti-
Democratic opponents to the USA as enemies. There also emerges the imperative 
for her own superiority and invulnerability and demands for unassailable leader-
ship and following from others who exclude a cooperative security policy a priori. 
Support for this important political might extends the security elite’s freedom of 
action. 
· This freedom of action is promoted by the way in which the image of the enemy is 
developed and presented in contrast to the democratic self-portrait. The moral 
contrast between ”we” and ”them” increases the impression of imminent danger 
and essential remedial action. Under the impression of this perceived danger, the 
concerned public agrees with the counter-measures proposed by the elite, as 
shown in the Iraq question. However, when told the details and questioned, this 
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public becomes more sceptical and critical. It is true, the public only comes across 
these details through the artificial means of a survey which, as known, only reaches 
a selected sample. 
Secondly, the anti-arms control tendencies of the 1990’s developed to the extent that the 
public rapidly lost interest in matters of nuclear armament. In the transition phase at the 
end of the Cold War, the attention paid was high, it was a question, however, of allaying 
the central danger of the old era, the intercontinental nuclear war. The American-Soviet 
(later Russian) talks received a lot of attention. This also applied to the period directly 
afterwards when the news of ”loose nukes” worried the public. Thereafter, the debate 
cooled off noticeably. The various proposals for extensive or comprehensive nuclear dis-
armament in the mid-1990’s were already more or less the pure concern of experts and 
failed to interest the public, the highly technical character of these concepts would have 
surely contributed to this, too. Towards the end of the 1990’s, there was just a very limited 
spell of public excitement about the Test Ban Treaty and its rejection, which was not 
enough, however, to lead to a really wide debate. Soon after that, September 11th domi-
nated the picture. By bringing together the terror risk, nuclear threat, proliferation and its 
own deterrence ability, the Bush government gave the impression of a competent and 
active response to a big threat. Vested with this trust, the government went about disman-
tling the multilateral, cooperative security policy scarcely unhindered. We are now facing 
the paradoxical result that the institutional mechanisms of American democracy have 
annulled the effectiveness of the most important mechanism for a peaceful democratic 
nature, the informed public debate. 
5.4 Outlook 
What faces us in the form of a problematic new orientation of American security policy is 
not, as often incorrectly claimed, the effect of American superiority. The position of the 
USA as the exception forms a ”structure of opportunity”, a wealth of possibilities which 
can be pursued in quite different ways. The way in which American governments have 
used them, also varied considerably in the 1990’s. The specific response of the current 
Bush administration is therefore not the result of international power relations. They 
simply enable the unfolding of American power, but do not define its contents and direc-
tion. The latter is much more the result of the internal American constellations. They can, 
therefore only be corrected conclusively by the USA. 
It is true that external interaction is useful and essential to this correction. The Ameri-
can public, especially the extremely silent yet existent ”Republican middle”, must be 
clearly shown that the USA is isolating herself with Bush policy, that friends are opposing 
her, and that, if she continues on this course, America will contravene her own interests. 
The signals that have been coming from Europe since George Bush took office, in this 
respect, have been nowhere near clear and uniform enough; the European countries’ ca-
cophonous Iraq policy is the most drastic example here.  
Yes, there is occasional criticism, yes, there were closed European positions here and 
there – for example in the case of bioweapons. But the resistance was altogether far too 
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dominated by efforts to play down differences in order to create a good mood among the 
allies. In addition to that, the USA has almost always managed to break down any united 
fronts of Europeans – when they have existed; Great Britain always played the role of the 
weakest member in this respect. 
When Europe decides to make progress with her project of an increasingly legitimised 
and multilateral security policy, there will be an urgent need for a change: Europe will 
speak either with one voice or collapse into vassals and pariahs. In this case, the steamrol-
ler of American unilateralism would roll on unstoppably. 
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Abbreviations 
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
CD Conference of Disarmament 
CISAC Committee on International Security and Arms Control 
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
CTR Co-operative Threat Reduction 
DCI Defense Counterproliferation Initiative 
DoD Department of Defense 
DoE Department of Energy 
HEU Highly Enriched Uranium 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
MPC&A Material Protection, Control & Accountancy 
NPR Nuclear Posture Review  
NPT Non-proliferation Treaty 
PAROS Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space 
PTBT Partial Test Ban Treaty 
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
SDI Strategic Defense Initiative 
SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile 
SLCM Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile 
SORT Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty 
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
STI Safeguards, Transparency, and Irreversibility 
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
TNW Tactical Nuclear Weapon 
 
